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"You're Fired!": 
The Common Law Should Respond with the 
Refashioned Tort of Abusive Discharge 
William R. Corbettt 
An at will prerogative without limits could be suffered only in an 
anarchy, and there notfor long-it certainly cannotbe suffered in a society 
such as ours without weakening the bond of counter balancingrights and 
obligationsthat holds such societies together. Thus, while there may be a 
right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, orfor an arbitraryor 
irrationalreason, there can be no right to terminate such a contractfor an 
unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. A diferent 
interpretationwould encourage andsanction lawlessness, which law by its 
very natureis designed to discourageandprevent.' 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many people are terminated or discharged from employment in the 
United States every day.2 "You're fired!" became the catchphrase of a former 
2. For example, the number of layoffs and discharges in December 2018 was 1.7 million, 
representing 1.1 percent of all workers. See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, , U.S. Dep't of 
Labor, Job Openings and Labor Turnover - December 2018, (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/jolts_02122019.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8P8-J4UG]. Of 
course, many ofthese could not plausibly be characterized as "wrongful" or "abusive." Given the state of 
the law in the United States, it would be very hard to estimate the number of alleged wrongful discharges. 
But see Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing 
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television personality in the U.S. version of The Apprentice.3 Although some 
people may have been entertained,4 albeit somewhat perversely and 
sadistically, by a person with authority proclaiming employment termination 
to subordinates, termination from employment is far from a joking matter in 
the real world beyond "reality television." 
Employment is a matter of great significance in the United States. 
Termination ends gainful employment and potentially diminishes future 
income, jeopardizes standard of living and financial security, and sometimes 
ruins careers. The financial benefits of employment in the United States are 
not limited to salary or wages. Health care coverage and retirement plans 
often are linked to one's job; thus, a person without a steady job may face 
difficulties in obtaining and maintaining adequate health insurance6 and/or 
adequately funded retirement savings plans.' Because of employees' 
dependence on employers for such benefits, "the risk of losing a job is 
significant over and above the loss of a paycheck."' This extensive degree of 
financial dependence of employees on their employers does not exist in 
nations that have free-standing safety nets and coverage plans.' Beyond the 
multi-faceted financial difficulty created by job loss, discharge from 
employment can damage the physical and mental health"o of the person who 
American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 348 n.6 (2014) (estimating that employers have 
terminated perhaps as many as 150,000 employees without cause in a year as early as 1983 and citing 
sources). 
3. Now-President Donald Trump even sought to trademark the phrase. See Martin Wolk, 'You're 
fired!' could become Trump trademark, UNBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 30, 2004), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4557459/ns/business-usbusiness/t/youre-fired-could-becometrump-
trademark/ [https://perma.cc/ZF2R-Y4MT]. His effort failed. See Eric Dash, 'Fired'Topped by 'Hired' 
At the Trademark Office, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/30/business/fired-topped-by-hired-at-the-trademark-office.html 
[https://perma.cc/M974-5L7L]. 
4. I vividly recall visiting the NBC studios in New York City during the height of popularity of 
The Apprentice. The paraphernalia for sale in the gift shop was dominated by coffee cups, tee-shirts, and 
other items imprinted with, "You're fired!" I am ashamed to admit that I bought some tee-shirts to give 
out as best-course-grade prizes in my Employment Law and Employment Discrimination classes. It 
seemed amusing at the time. Now, as I write this Article, it seems less so. 
5. See, e.g., Estreicher & Hirsch, supranote 2, at 346 n. 1. (citing sources regarding the estimated 
lifetime loss ofearnings caused by termination). 
6. See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Who's Afraid of PersonalResponsibility?Health Savings 
Accounts and the Future ofAmerican Health Care,36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 535, 540 (2005); Michael J. 
Zimmer, Inequality,IndividualizedRisk, andInsecurity, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1, -20, 24 (2013). 
7. See Zimmer, supra note 6, at 21-24. 
8. Id. at 24. 
9. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty,88 WASH. U. L. REv. 433, 
434 (2010) (stating that "[m]ore than other developed nations, the United States relies on private promises 
to assure health and retirement security ... . These promises involve 'employee benefits."'). 
10. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Sprang, After-Acquired Evidence: Tonic for an Employer's Cognitive 
Dissonance,60 Mo. L. REV. 89, 134 n.187 (1995). A pithy quote makes the point about the devastating 
effects ofbeing fired: "It's a recession when your neighbor loses his job; it's a depression when you lose 
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loses a job because many Americans identify so closely with their jobs" It is 
not an overstatement to say that termination from employment places in 
jeopardy many of the key elements of an American's citizenship, 2 and seen 
in this way, abusive terminations injure society at large.13 Termination 
deprives a person of one job and generally makes it more difficult to get 
another job.'4 Consider, for example, the issue of discrimination against the 
unemployed-the view that one must have a job in order to be considered for 
a job vacancy.' 
In spite of the potentially devastating effects of termination to 
individuals and to society, the law of the United States generally accords 
employers the discretion to discharge employees for good or bad reasons 
yours." The original source of the quote is a bit murky; it has been called an economists' joke and 
attributed to President Harry Truman. Harry S Truman, in OBSERVER, April 13, 1958; Richard A. Posner, 
When Does a Depressionor aRecession End?, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2009). Although the quote often 
is attributed to President Ronald Reagan, he actually borrowed and modified the quote to make a different 
point to his political advantage: "A recession is whgn your neighbor loses his job. A depression is when 
you lose yours. And recovery is when Jimmy Carter loses his." Jessica Ramirez, Economy: Are We in a 
Recession or Depression?,NEWSWEEK (Oct. 15, 2008). 
I1. See, e.g., PAUL C. WElLER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 49 (1990) (positing that a person's 
job "is valuable both because it generates the earnings which probably constitute the major financial 
support for the worker and his family, and because work is so important to the personal identity and sense 
of self-worth of the employee"); Cornelius J. Peck, PenetratingDoctrinalCamouflage: Understanding 
the Development of Wrongful Discharge,66 WASH L. REV. 719, 719 (1991) (observing that Americans 
are often said to "describe themselves in terms of the jobs they hold"); Michael S. Knoll, Perchanceto 
Dream:The GlobalEconomy andthe AmericanDream, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (1993) ("For many 
Americans much of their identity is tied to their jobs and to their ability to provide for their families."). 
12. Professor Matthew Finkin succinctly chronicles the transition in the United States from an 
economy dominated by independent producers to an economy dominated by financially dependent 
employees. MATTHEW W. FrNKIN, AMERICAN LABOR AND THE LAW: DORMANT, RESURGENT, AND 
EMERGENT PROBLEMS 3-15 (2019). Professor Finkinjoins others in arguing that holding a job is a crucial 
attribute of economic citizenship. Id. at 97. Indeed, it was the idea that employers possess the power to 
end this crucial attribute of citizenship that prompted Professor Lawrence Blades to propose the tort of 
abusive discharge in his influential article in 1967. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. 
IndividualFreedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise ofEmployer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 
1404 (1967) (discussing the "threat to individual freedom posed by employer power"). 
13. Professor Blades, in proposing the tort of abusive discharge, noted the constitutional limitations 
imposed on governmental employers, such as restrictions on firing employees for exercising their rights 
under the First Amendment. See Blades, supranote 12, at 1431-32. 
14. It is common practice for prospective employers to ask for employment history on applications 
and to ask applicants to explain reasons for separation from priorjobs. On the phenomenon of "scarring," 
see J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation ofEmployment Reference Practices,65 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 147 
(1998) ("Scarring occurs when employers rely on labor market signals, such as prior employment history 
or employment references, to deny ajob to someone who could be profitably employed."). 
15. See, e.g., Hope Delaney Skibitsky, Note, Jobless in America, DiscriminationAgainst the 
Unemployed andthe Efficacy ofState andFederalProtectedClass Legislation,66 RUTGERS L. REV. 209 
(2013). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has conducted hearings on the issue of 
discrimination against the unemployed. See Press Release, EEOC, EEOC to Examine Treatment of 
Unemployed Job Seekers (Feb. 14, 2011), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-14-1 I a.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/SQJ4-2QJZ]. 
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under the employment-at-will doctrine.1 6 Even with that default rule, 
however, some firings just seem to be so bad, unfair, arbitrary, or abusive 
that they should fall beyond the pale of what is permitted by law without 
redress." Indeed, there are exceptions to employment at will in U.S. law, all 
of which may be grouped under the umbrella term "wrongful discharge," in 
the sense that they are legal bases for seeking redress for terminations 
notwithstanding the default rule of employment at will.'" Among the 
exceptions, there are a multitude of federal, state, and local statutes or 
ordinances that prohibit terminations for certain reasons or under certain 
circumstances. ' The common law, through contract and tort law, also limits 
employers' prerogative to fire employees, but the common law has proven 
much more problematic, incoherent, and uncertain than the statutory 
exceptions.20 First, although there are a variety of contract and tort doctrines 
that ostensibly limit employment at will, none actually imposes significant 
limitations on employer prerogative in that plaintiff employees rarely recover 
under the various common law theories.2 While it is true that plaintiffs are 
more likely to recover for wrongful terminations in some states than in others, 
depending on the particular state's adherence to a strong version of 
employment at will and the statutory and common law exceptions available 
in that state's law, discharged employees do not fare well in the run of 
termination lawsuits.22 Second, beyond the paucity of employee recoveries 
under the various common law theories, the common law is not easily 
comprehensible or applicable.23 For example, it is difficult to identify a 
consensus understanding of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing,24 and there are many different understandings and iterations of the 
tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (WDVPP).2 5 It is 
unsurprising that contract law is ineffective at providing terminated 
16. See infraPart II for discussion of the employment-at-will doctrine. 
17. See, e .g., Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Dischargeand the Searchfor Third-PartyEffects, 74 
TEX. L. REv. 1943, 1943 (1996) ("Even in the rough-and-tumble world of the at-will workplace, some 
injustices cry out for a judicial remedy."). 
18. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge:A Continuum Approach, 73 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 517, 519 (2004) (defining and using "wrongful discharge" in this broad sense). 
19. See infraParts IV & V. 
20. See infra Parts IV & V; see generallyJ. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment andthe Common 
Law: A ModestProposalto De-MarginalizeEmployment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347 (1995). 
21. See, e.g., Estreicher & Hirsch, supranote 2, at 445 (describing the low probability ofemployees 
winning employment cases but the potential for large recoveries if victorious); Mark P. Gergen, A 
GrudgingDefenseofthe Role ofthe CollateralTorts in Wrongful TerminationLitigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1693, 1726-37 (1996). 
22. See sources cited supranote 21. 
23. See infraParts IV and V. 
24. See, e.g., Peck, supranote 11, at 739-43; Bird, supra note 18, at 543-50. 
25. See, e.g., Parkersupra note 20, at 355-56. 
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employees redress, given that the employment-at-will doctrine fits 
principally under contract law,26 describing the default rule for duration of an 
employment agreement and absence of a good-cause limitation on 
termination. Tort law, on the other hand, could have developed in a way that 
would have provided a meaningful limitation on employer prerogative to 
terminate. So far, it has not. This Article seeks to change that result. 
I have argued that we need a reinvigorated2 7 common law of the 
workplace to augment the burgeoning body of employment law statutes, 
regulations, and ordinances at the federal, state, and local levels. More 
specifically, I have argued for more robust tort theories to be developed and 
brought to bear to protect workers' rights and interests. This is the 
wheelhouse of tort law-recognizing duties to avoid inflicting potentially 
grave personal, property, economic, and relationship28 damage without a 
2 9justification. For example, I argued for modification and development of 
the tort of invasion of privacy and the defenses associated with it to provide 
more protection of workers' privacy interests and redress for violations of 
those interests in a world in which information technology increasingly is 
eroding privacy in the workplace and beyond.30 As a response to bad, abusive 
terminations (particularly terminations involving women), I proposed 
application of a stronger version of the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress ("IED")." Furthermore, I argued that the tort of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy ("WDVPP") could be 
reconceptualized and deployed to provide greater protection of workers' 
autonomy rights and interests.32 
In this Article, I build on my theme of arguing for a more robust common 
law of employment through innovations in tort law by proposing a 
reconceptualization of the tort theories that have been applied to terminations 
by recognition of a refashioned tort of abusive discharge. Professor Lawrence 
Blades's proposal of the tort of abusive discharge in his important 1967 
26. See infraPart V.B. 
27. See infra Part IV. The 1970s and 1980s were a time ofactive experimentation and development 
in many state courts-o much so that commentators predicted the demise of employment at will. To 
borrow immortal words of Mark Twain, "The reports of [employment at will's] death are greatly 
exaggerated." 
28. See Peter Linzer, The Decline ofAssent: At- Will Employment as a CaseStudy ofthe Breakdown 
ofPrivateLaw Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 323, 390 (1986) (discussing Leon Green's work on expansion of 
tort law to relational injuries). 
29. See infraPartV. 
30. William R. Corbett, The Needfora Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. 
REv. 91 (2003). 
3 1. William R. Corbett, An OutrageousResponse to "You're Fired!"92 N.C.L. REV. ADDENDUM 
17 (2013) [hereinafter, Corbett, An OutrageousResponse]. 
32. William R. Corbett, FindingA Better Way Around Employment at Will: ProtectingEmployees' 
Autonomy Interests Through Tort Law, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 101 (2018). 
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article has not been fully realized in the case law recognizing and developing 
the tort of WDVPP. That nebulous and vexing tort, recognized in different 
versions in various states, has proven largely impotent in providing a 
recovery for discharged employees.33 Commentators' attempts to explain the 
development of the tort, although helpful, provide little concrete guidance,34 
and in my view do not move us toward a tort theory that can be reliably used 
to provide relief for truly bad terminations. IIED also has been applied to 
terminations, but its application has been even less efficacious than that of 
WDVPP.3 ' A tort is a terrible thing to waste. The tort theories applicable to 
wrongful discharge should be made both effective and coherent. Given the 
interests at stake and the extreme employment action at issue, 6 it seems 
worthwhile to have a viable tort theory. Humbly, I attempt to take on the 
mantle of Professor Blades and propose a blending of WDVPP and IIED to 
create a refurbished hybrid tort7 of abusive discharge.3 8 
33. See infraPart V.A. 
34. See infra Part V.B. 
35. See infra Part V.C. 
36. Termination or discharge has been referred to as the capital punishment of employment. MARK 
A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 910 (4th ed. 1998); Paul 
Berks, Social Change and Judicial Response: The Handbook Exception to Employment-At-Will, 4 
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 231, 248 & n.59 (2000). 1 do not argue for the tort that I propose to be 
extended to other adverse employment actions. Although there are good arguments for such an extension, 
I do not advocate such an extension because I prefer to propose an incursion and limitation on employers' 
prerogative regarding the most substantial and significant adverse employment action. Courts are reluctant 
to oversee employers' personnel decisions even on the matter of termination. To subject all disciplinary 
actions to court review would be to make courts super personnel boards and to impinge too much on 
employer operational prerogative. Cf Blades, supra note 12, at 1406. The Restatement takes the position 
that constructive discharge is covered by the tort, but it does not take a position on extending the tort to 
other wrongful discipline. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
37. Professor Anita Bernstein's insightful analysis on how new torts are made probably would not 
presage that my proposal will be successful, but I hope to improve the odds by presenting abusive 
discharge not as a new tort, but as a blending and repackaging of two torts that have been applied to 
terminations for over halfa century. Moreover, I trace the lineage ofthis refashioned tort back to Professor 
Blades's highly regarded article. Thus, there is nothing novel here, and I am not really the creator of the 
proposed tort. See Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539 
(1997). 
38. Why "abusive discharge" rather than "wrongful discharge" or some other moniker? First, 
"wrongful discharge" does not meaningfully and effectively distinguish the tort from wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy. The reconceptualized tort should not be handicapped by the case law and 
analytical baggage that has enervated the public policy tort. See infra Part V.A. Second, I am trying to 
return from the ineffective tort theories applied to terminations today to a broader tort, similar to that 
proposed by Professor Blades. 
Although the tort I propose is not exactly what he proposed, it is intended to be broader than the 
public policy tort and to be supported by the prima face tort rationale relied upon by Blades. See infra Part 
V.A. The fundamental concept is that the tort will permit recovery when an employer abuses the right 
bestowed by employment at will--to discharge without a job-related reason. The concept is similar to the 
civil law tort doctrine of abuse of rights. Although that doctrine means different things in different civil 
law jurisdictions, generally it prohibits one who holds a right from exercising it against the interests of 
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I name the proposed tort "abusive discharge" rather than "wrongful 
discharge" or some other moniker for a couple of reasons. First, "wrongful 
discharge" does not meaningfully and effectively distinguish the tort from 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The reconceptualized tort 
should not be handicapped with the case law and analytical baggage that has 
enervated the public policy tort.39 Second, I am trying to return from the 
ineffective tort theories applied to terminations today to a broader tort, similar 
to that proposed by Professor Blades. Although the tort I propose is not 
exactly what he proposed, it is intended to be broader than the public policy 
tort and to be supported by the prima face tort rationale relied upon by 
Blades.4 0 The fundamental concept is that the tort will permit recovery when 
an employer abuses the right bestowed by employment at will-to discharge 
without a job-related reason. The concept is similar to the civil law tort 
doctrine of abuse of rights. Although that doctrine means different things in 
different civil law jurisdictions, generally it prohibits one who holds a right 
from exercising it against the interests of society or for the purpose of injuring 
another.41 Whereas Blades framed his tort based on wrongful motives, I 
would include wrongful motives and, borrowing from intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, egregious terminations that should not be tolerated by 
society. Terminations that are simply unfair would not be actionable under 
the tort I propose because such a broad standard of liability would eviscerate 
employment at will, and such a proposal would be futile because neither our 
legislatures nor our courts are willing to abandon employment at will. What 
society or for the purpose of injuring another. See generally Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old 
Principle,A New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389 (2002). 
Louisiana, as a mixed civil and common law jurisdiction, recognizes the abuse-of-rights doctrine. 
See, e.g., Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc., 521 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 4h Cir.), writ denied, 522 So. 
2d 571 (La. 1988). However, because Louisiana has fully embraced the common law doctrine of 
employment at will, abuse of rights has not been an effective theory for terminated at-will employees. See 
id.; Walther v. National Tea Co., 848 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1988). Professor Perillo has suggested that 
American law does implicitly recognize the abuse ofrights doctrine, and WDVPP is one manifestation of 
that recognition. See Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse ofRights: A PervasiveLegal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J. 37, 54-
57 (1995). I am grateful to Professor Matthew Finkin for suggesting consideration of the abuse-of-rights 
doctrine. 
39. See infra Part V.A. 
40. Id. 
41. See generallyMichael Byers, Abuse ofRights: An Old Principle,A New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 
389 (2002). Louisiana, as a mixed civil and common law jurisdiction, recognizes the abuse-of-rights 
doctrine. See, e.g., Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc., 521 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988), writ 
denied, 522 So. 2d 571 (La. 1988). However, because Louisiana has fully embraced the common law 
doctrine of employment at will, abuse of rights has not been an effective theory for terminated at-will 
employees. See id.; Walther v. National Tea Co., 848 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1988). Professor Perillo has 
suggested that American law does implicitly recognize the abuse ofrights doctrine, and WDVPP is one 
manifestation of that recognition. See Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse ofRights: A PervasiveLegal Concept, 27 
PAC. L.J. 37, 54-57 (1995). l am grateful to Professor Matthew Finkin for suggesting consideration ofthe 
abuse-of-rights doctrine. 
71 2020 THE REFASHIONED TORT OFABUSIVE DISCHARGE 
courts may be willing to do is to impose a more significant limitation on 
employment at will, reflecting societal values regarding the importance of 
employment, and to adopt a tort theory that provides a more cogent analysis 
for the types of cases for which they permit recovery. 
I do not presume that my proposal for a refurbished tort theory 
applicable to terminations is a panacea for the insecurity and hardships 
workers face because of employment at will. A more comprehensive solution 
could be states enacting wrongful discharge statutes, but so far only one state 
has done that, and no others seem likely to do so in the foreseeable future. 
Furthermore, I recognize that employees face a number of obstacles to 
recovering in private lawsuits based on common law theories, including 
securing adequate representation and often being bound to arbitration.42 
However, many of these obstacles also apply to some extent to many 
statutory claims. Thus, a more robust tort theory is not a complete, perfect, 
or necessarily even the best, solution to the employment insecurity faced by 
most workers. Nonetheless, incremental improvement is worthwhile. 
Society, employees, and the law would be better served by a new tort theory 
that is cogent, that provides some prospect for recovery, and that openly 
declares a societal value that some terminations are intolerable to society than 
by the current tort theories applied to terminations. Moreover, proposals for 
incremental improvements in the law can spark larger changes by starting a 
discussion and provoking a reassessment of the existing law. Professor 
Blades's proposal in 1967 played a role in spurring a period of creative and 
energetic development of common law. That common law development, in 
turn, played a role in the proposal and enactment of legislation. Admittedly, 
the employment law landscape has changed since the 1970s and 1980s, but 
it is possible that common law innovation again could spark a reassessment 
and adjustment of employment at will. Indeed, employment at will could be 
more vulnerable today than it was in 1967.43 At a minimum, tort law applied 
to a matter as important as termination from employment can be and should 
be better than it is. 
Part II discusses employment at will and exceptions to employment at 
will. Part III considers American exceptionalism regarding the law of 
employment termination and proposals to end the rogue status of the United 
States by statutorily abolishing or limiting employment at will. Part IV 
42. Professor Clyde Summers was not an advocate for the common law theories that emerged uring 
the 1970s and I 980s. See Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary 
Guidelines and Proposals,141 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 472 (1992) ("Common law remedies for wrongful 
discharge, however 'wrongful' is substantively defined, have little to commend them.") [hereinafter 
Summers, Effective Remedies]. 
43. It is difficult to assess this proposition. There are many more exceptions to employment at will 
than there were in the 1970s and 1980s. It is not clear whether that makes employment at will more or less 
susceptible to change. 
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discusses the common law limitations on employment at will and the features 
of contract law that prevent it from providing a credible check on 
employment at will. Part V discusses the inadequacy of existing tort law to 
provide appropriate limits on employment at will. Part VI proposes a 
refurbished tort of abusive discharge fashioned largely from the tort theories 
of IED applied to termination and WDVPP. I conclude that the time has 
come for courts again to develop a common law restriction on employment 
at will-the tort of abusive discharge. 
II. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL AND EXCEPTIONS 
A. "ForGoodReason, BadReason, or No Reason at All" 
The United States is known in the world as a hire-and-fire society." The 
signature45 feature of the nation's employment law is the employment-at-will 
doctrine, which provides that employers may fire employees "for a good 
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all." 46 Imagine that-terminating an 
employee for no reason at all!47 Beyond the legal right to fire for any reason 
at any time, employers generally also may fire most at-will employees 
without following procedures, without giving notice, and without providing 
44. Thomas C. Kohler, The Employment Relation andIts Orderingat Century's End: Reflections 
on Emerging Trends in the United States, 41 B.C. L. REv. 103, 103-04 (1999) ("Foreign observers 
typically characterize [the United States] as a 'hire and fire' society. . . ."). 
45. "Signature" in the sense that we have it, and no one else does-at least not the extreme version 
that we do. See infra Part III.A. The Restatement of Employment Law recognizes the centrality of 
employment at will to the employment law of the United States. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
LAW § 2.01 (2015). 
46. See, e.g., Enquist v. Oregon Dep't ofAgric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008); Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 
81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruledonothergrounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915). 
Many sources are cited for this famous or infamous statement of employment at will. 
47. The last part of this statement of EAW that employers may fire for no reason at all appears 
hyperbolic. People do not do anything for no reason at all. Professor Weiler contends that employers do 
not wish to fire employees without a good, job-related reason because of the losses that result to the 
business. See WElLER, supra note 11, at 59. Actually, however, "no reason at all" is the part of the 
statement that best explains how employment at will operates in litigation. For termination of at-will 
employees, employers are not required, when sued for discharge, to provide a reason for the termination. 
If the former at-will employee claims that she was terminated for an illegal reason, the initial burden of 
production is on the plaintiff to present evidence of the reason. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Wrongful 
DischargeProtectionsin an At- Will World, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1655, 1669-70 (1996) (stating that "[p]roof 
of a wrongful discharge requires the plaintiff to prove a particular unlawful motive on the part of the 
employer, ofwhom the law otherwise requires no reason at all"); Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law 
ofEmployment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631, 645-46 (1988). 
Consider, for example, the McDonnell Douglaspretext analysis for disparate treatment employment 
discrimination claims. The initial burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, after which the 
burden of production shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason" for the adverse employment action. See generally SANDRA F. SPERINO, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: 
THE MOST IMPORTANT CASE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2018). 
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48severance pay. It is important to recognize that, while employment at will 
is thought of as the basic and default employment termination law of the 
United States, employment at will is not federal law; it is state law,
4 9 with 
forty-nine states adhering to it,5 0 most by case law 5 ' but some by statute.5 2 
The genesis of employment at will in the United States has been fertile 
ground for discussion and debate among scholars. Rather than going into 
extensive detail in attempting to clarify the origins of the doctrine, I offer a 
few observations. Poor, beleaguered Horace Gay Wood, a lawyer and treatise 
writer who has become the Aaron Burr of employment law," bears the brunt 
of criticism from employment-at-will detractors for pronouncing 
employment at will in his treatise on master and servant in 1877 and citing 
authority that did not clearly support the rule.54 While Mr. Wood undeniably 
48. See, e.g., Rachel Amow-Richman, MainstreamingEmployment Contract Law: The Common 
Law Casefor Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1522 (2014) ("Although it is 
generally thought of and treated as a single rule, employment at will is a multipart doctrine from which 
three distinct principles can be derived .... ."). 
49. It is not easy to classify employment at will. It may be considered a doctrine, a rule, or an 
evidentiary presumption. It seems most accurate to characterize it as an evidentiary presumption-a 
rebuttable presumption that applies unless and until the plaintiff presents evidence that she had an 
employment agreement that differs from the default at-will arrangement. The Restatement labels it a 
"default rule" ofcontract law and a "rebuttable presumption." See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
§ 2.01 cmt b (2015); see also Amow-Richman, supra note 48, at 1522; David J. Walsh & Joshua L. 
Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful DischargeDoctrines:Up-Date, Refinement, andRationales, 33 
AM. Bus. L.J. 645, 668 (1996). However, courts in most states apply such a strong version of the 
presumption that it approaches a rule of substantive law. See, e.g., Parker,supranote 20, at 349-52. 
50. Montana is the lone state to have enacted a statutory abrogation of employment at will-the 
Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, discussed below. See infra Part III.B. Puerto Rico 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands also do not follow employment at will. See generally Jorge M. Farinacci-
Fem6s, The Searchfor a Wrongful DismissalStatute: A Look at PuertoRico's Act No. 88 as a Potential 
StartingPoint, 17 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 125 (2013). 
51. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An EmpiricalandEconomic Reassessment of
the Rise ofEmployment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679, 690 (1994). 
52. The Arizona Employment Protection Act states that the employment relationship is contractual 
and is presumed to be at will, but can be modified by a writing signed by the parties. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 
23-1501 (2019). Georgia and Louisiana courts have recognized statutes as codifying employment at will. 
See, e.g., Land v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 203 S.E 316, 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 
34-7-1); Quebedeaux v. Dow Chem. Co., 820 So. 2d 542, 545 (La. 2002) (citing LA. CIV. CODE ART. 
2747). 
53. Like Burr, who is remembered only for killing Alexander Hamilton in a duel, Wood, a prolific 
treatise writer and lawyer, is known almost exclusively for penning the rule of employment at will in his 
Master-Servant treatise. See, e.g., Theodore St. Antoine, You're Fired!, 10 HUM. RTs. Q. 32, 33 (1982) 
(describing the at-will rule as having "spr[u]ng full-blown .. . from [Wood's] busy and perhaps careless 
pen"). Mr. Wood likely will fare no better in the unlikely event a playwright ever writes a play about 
employment at will. See HAMILTON: AN AMERICAN MUSICAL (2015). 
54. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment as an 
InterjurisdictionalRace to the Bottom ofEmployment Standards,75 TENN. L. REv. 453, 457 (2008). For 
scholars criticizing the work of Wood, see, e.g., J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract 
Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974); Clyde Summers, IndividualProtectionAgainst 
UnjustDismissal: Time fora Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976). There also are defenses of Wood, 
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wrote in his treatise that employment at will was the American rule, blaming 
(or crediting) that statement for the genesis of employment at will goes too 
far." It is true that Wood's treatise was cited as authority for the proposition,56 
but it is hyperbole to brand it the origin of the rule. 
Given that I am arguing for common law to be modified to place more 
substantial limitation on employment at will, it is worthwhile to consider 
briefly what forces gave rise to employment at will. Furthermore, it is 
appropriate to sketch the defenses of employment at will offered by its 
apologists. First, why did employment at will become the law of fifty states 
(before Montana defected in 1987)? There are several theories offered to 
explain this phenomenon. Three of the principal theories were propounded 
by Professors Sanford Jacoby, Jacob Feinman, and Andrew Morriss.17 The 
theories are more complex, but I offer a succinct and overly simplified 
capsule of each. Professor Feinman argued that the courts adhered to the rule 
to preserve the power of the capitalist owners ofbusinesses in the face of the 
ascent of, and threat posed by, the middle-level managers." Morriss labels 
the Feinman theory as "crushing the middle class."59 Professor Jacoby 
focused on the historical context of the struggle between employers on the 
one hand and stronger labor unions and mid-level managers with relatively 
higher social class standing on the other in Britain, yielding a presumed term 
contract in the courts. In contrast, the stronger employers and weaker labor 
such as Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenanceof "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 554 (1990). Wood's statement ofthe rule was as follows: 
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, 
and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by 
proof. ... [Ilt is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in this 
respect there is no distinction between domestic and other servants. 
HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877). 
55. See, e.g., Peck, supranote I1, at 722. Professor Peck points out that the New York "Field Code" 
and other sources tated the rule of employment at will. Id. Professor Morriss has mapped the chronology 
of adoption of employment at will in the states and suggested several reasons why the courts adopted it. 
See Morriss, supranote 51. Professor Richard Bales, considering the state adoption progression described 
by Morriss, opined that "once the first underindustrialized states adopted the rule, other 
underindustrialized states would have been compelled to follow suit to remain economically competitive 
with the early adopters. Industrialized states would then have been compelled to adopt the rule, as well, 
to maintain their competitive advantage in the labor market .... The adoption of the at-will rule by a 
handful of underindustrialized states, therefore, precipitated an interjurisdictional race to the bottom." 
Bales, supranote 54, at 455. 
56. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual 
Employees: FairRepresentation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1084 (1984) 
[hereinafter Summers, The ContractofEmployment]. 
57. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, The Development of the At-Will Rule Revisited: A Challenge to 
Its Originsas Based in the Development of Advanced Capitalism, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 75, 82 n.43 
(1995). 
58. Jay M. Feinman, The Development ofthe Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 
(1976). 
59. Morriss, supra note 51, at 693. 
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unions and mid-level managers with relatively lower class standing in the 
U.S. yielded the at-will rule in the courts.60 Morriss calls the Jacoby theory 
"social class and weak unions."61 Professor Morriss, examining the 
chronology of adoptions of the at-will rule by the various states, rejects the 
related theories of Feinman and Sanford and instead posits that the rule was 
adopted by courts because it was administratively felicitous for courts that 
were (and are) ill-suited to determining employment disputes.62 
Regardless of the origin of the doctrine or the reasons for its adoption 
and proliferation, employment at will is the default rule in 49 states. 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has stated that federal 
government employment is at will in the absence of contrary legislation, 
although many positions in public employment, both federal and state, do 
have procedural prerequisites and/or good cause protection.' Whether 
employment at will needs to be preserved in the strong version that exists 
throughout the nation65 or it needs to be restricted by further statutory, 
regulatory or common developments will be discussed below.66 
B. Exceptions-EmployeesNot Terminable at Will andEmployees at Will 
Who Are Not Terminablefor CertainBadReasons 
Although employment at will is the dominant principle regarding 
employment termination in the United States, it is subject to many 
qualifications and exceptions. These exceptions are often viewed as legal 
erosions of, or impingements on, employment at will." However, there are 
differences in these exceptions that cause me to divide them into two 
categories. First, there are employees who simply are not terminable-at-will 
employees. They may be made other than at-will employees either by 
contract or by statute. Second, there are at-will employees who cannot be 
fired for certain bad reasons or under certain circumstances as defined by 
either statute (or ordinance) or tort law. 
60. Sanford M. Jacoby, The DurationofIndefinite Employment Contractsin the UnitedStates and 
England:An HistoricalAnalysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85 (1982). 
61. Morris, supra note 51, at 694. 
62. Id at695-96. 
63. Enquistv. Oregon Dep't ofAgric., 553 U.S. 591, 606 (2008). 
64. See generally Joseph E. Slater, The "American Rule" That Swallows the Exceptions, 11 
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53, 83 (2007). 
65. Although employment at will is a strong default principle in 49 states, the strength of 
employment at will does vary among the states. For example, states recognize different statutory, contract, 
and tort exceptions to employment at will. Moreover, states differ regarding their interpretations of 
contract and tort exceptions, such as wrongful discharge in violation ofpublic policy. See infraPart V.A. 
66. See infra Part ILA, III.B. 
67. See, e.g., Leonard,supra note 47, at 632 (stating that employment at will "has experienced great 
erosion"). 
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1. Employees Who Are Not TerminableAt Will: ContractualandStatutory 
Protections 
The common law of contracts recognizes employment contracts that are 
not at will. Employees are not at will if they have an individual contract or 
are covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provides for terms 
other than at-will termination, such as a good-cause requirement for 
discharge or a specified term of employment. A very small percentage of 
workers in the U.S. have individual contracts that vary employment at will." 
Collective contracts (collective bargaining agreements) negotiated by unions 
almost always vary employment at will and provide good-cause protection. 
However, the percentage of employees who are members of unions has been 
declining for decades, and now only about ten-and-a-half percent of the 
combined public and private sector workforce and just over six percent of 
private sector employees are even represented by unions." Plaintiffs who 
claim to be other than terminable at will by the terms of an individual or 
collective contract sue employers for breach of express or implied contract 
terms or file grievances under the procedures established by their collective 
bargaining agreements. 
Beyond the common law ofcontracts, there are civil service statutes that 
provide good-cause and procedural protections to classified employees in 
both federal and state employment." Tenure rules at various levels of 
68. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 747 (3d ed. 2005) ("Relatively few workers 
have individual written contracts of employment"); Timothy J. Coley, Contracts, Custom, and the 
Common Law: Towards a Renewed Prominencefor Contract Law in American Wrongful Discharge 
Jurisprudence, 24 BYU J. PUB. L. 193, 210 (2010) (stating that "[i]n the contemporary American 
employment market, employees working under individual work contracts are by far the exception to the 
norm, and contract-employees have traditionally been thought of as belonging to a relatively confined 
number ofpositions .... 1"). 
69. See, e.g., Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Towarda Theory of "JustCause"in Employee 
DisciplineCases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594,594-95 ("Virtually every collective bargaining agreement contains 
some such limitations. ... [The just cause] requirement is so well accepted that often it is found to be 
implicit in the collective agreement, even when there is no stated limitation on the employer's power to 
discipline."); Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement i  Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 22 n.1 11 (1988) ("Most collective agreements require 'cause' or 'just cause' for discharge or 
discipline. Even in the absence ofan express 'just cause' limitation, arbitrators will imply such a limitation 
on discharge.") (citing F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 652 (4th ed. 1985)). 
70. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm [https://perma.cc/HYS5-7UFC). A somewhat higher 
percentage likely is covered by collective bargaining agreements, as unions that are certified as collective 
bargaining representatives bargain for the entire bargaining unit and not just members. Union density in 
the public sector has been much higher than in the private sector, and that remains so today. Id. It remains 
to be seen what effect the Supreme Court's recent decision in Janusv. AFSCMEC 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2478 (2018) (holding that state agency-fee laws regarding public sector jobs are unconstitutional), will 
have on public sector union density. 
71. See, e.g., Seymour Moskowitz, Employment at Will and Codes of Ethics: The Professional's 
Dilemma, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 33, 46 (1988). Professor Leonard notes an irony regarding the job security 
of many civil service employees: "[P]ublic sector employees, whose salaries and benefits are paid from 
77 2020 THEREFASHIONED TORT OFABUSIVE DISCHARGE 
educational institutions provide protections of the good cause and procedural 
varieties. 72 
Professor Richard Thompson Ford succinctly summarizes the sources 
that change at-will employment: "Employment at will ... sometimes .. . is 
superseded by other arrangements, such as civil service rules, union 
contracts, academic tenure .... 
2. At Will Employees Who CannotBe FiredForCertainReasons or Under 
CertainCircumstances:Statutory, Constitutional,andTort Protections 
Although they do not render employees other than at will, many federal 
and state statutes and local ordinances provide remedies for covered74 
employees, including at-will employees, who are terminated7 1 for certain 
specified "bad" reasons or without certain procedures being followed before 
discharge. First, there is a large body of anti-discrimination statutes and 
ordinances at all levels of government prohibiting terminations based on 
specified characteristics, such as race, sex, disability, etc. The large body of 
anti-discrimination statutes is the most substantial restriction on termination 
of at-will employees." Another very large body of statutes and ordinances 
taxes extracted from unprotected private sector employees, may have enforceable employment rights due 
to federal or state civil service regulations and constitutional protections against arbitrary decision making 
by their governmental employers." Leonard, supranote 47, at 647. 
72. Mark L. Adams, The Questfor Tenure: Job Security andAcademic Freedom, 56 CATH. U. L. 
REv. 67, 74 (2006) ("The awarding oftenure thus changes the employment-at-will relationship ...."). 
73. Richard Thompson Ford, Discounting Discrimination: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Proves That 
Yesterday's Civil Rights Laws Can'tKeep up with Today's Economy, 5 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 69, 80 
(2011). 
74. Many of these laws have specifications regarding coverage. For example, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 applies to employers with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
75. In addition to terminations, most such statutes prohibit other employment actions classified as 
adverse employment actions. They do not necessarily reach all negative job actions, as some are 
considered too de minimis to merit protection. See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis 
Discrimination,47 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998). 
76. Some commentators have commented on the perception that the combination of at-will 
employment and the substantial exception of anti-discrimination statutes creates "differential standards 
for termination"-that white men are the least protected at-will employees. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, 
Labor andEmployment Law at the Millennium: A HistoricalReview andCriticalAssessment, 43 B.C. L. 
REv. 351, 408-09 (2002); Jeffrey Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More With Less, 68 MD. L. 
REv. 89, 140 (2008) (noting "an unfortunate irony that deeming certain characteristics as especially 
worthy of protection inevitably fosters resentment from those not sharing those traits"); Estlund, supra 
note 47, at 1679 (arguing that antidiscrimination law co-existing with employment at will "contribute[s] 
to perverse employer incentives and to divisive tensions between members of 'protected groups,' . . .and 
other employees"); Leonard, supranote 47, at 680 (arguing for expansion ofprotection to level the playing 
field and afford equality oftreatment). While the anti-discrimination statutes prohibit discrimination based 
on any race or color and either sex, the evidentiary requirements may be higher for whites and males 
because of the reasonable presumptions flowing from our historical discrimination against African 
Americans and women. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate 
Impact Claims by White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1505 (2004). 
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prohibits discharges77  for specified retaliatory reasons. Every federal 
employment statute has an anti-retaliation provision 7 and many state and 
local laws do as well, such as some state workers compensation statutes. A 
third type of statute that has proliferated in the last two or three decades is 
whistleblower statutes.79 The whistleblower statutes bear the closest 
relationship to the tort theory of WDVPP; in fact, one category of WDVPP 
is whistleblower claims.so Increasingly in recent decades, however, the need 
for whistleblower tort claims has dissipated as more and more whistleblower 
statutes have been enacted.' A fourth consideration among federal 
legislation is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of 
1974.82 Although ERISA is not primarily protection against employment 
termination, it creates nonforfeitable rights in benefits, and thus impacts 
incentives and expectations of employers and employees regarding job 
security/tenure." Finally, there are a variety ofother statutes, primarily at the 
state level, that prohibit terminations for various reasons, such as an 
employee's participation in lawful off-duty activity or pursuit of a certain 
lifestyle choice.84 
Federal and state constitutions also may provide recourse for terminated 
federal or state public employees. Under appropriate fact situations, public 
sector employees assert claims pursuant to section 19835 that that they have 
been terminated because of their exercise of constitutionally protected rights, 
such as rights under the First Amendment.86 State government employees 
also may assert claims that their terminations violate rights under their state 
constitutions. 
77. The statutes also prohibit other adverse employment actions. See supranote 75. 
78. See, e.g., Alex B. Long, Employment Retaliationand the Accident ofText, 90 OR. L. REV. 525, 
528 (2011) ("All of the other major federal employment statutes either contain explicit prohibitions on 
employer retaliation or have been held to prohibit employer retaliation."). 
79. Consider, for example, the many federal whistleblower statutes within the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Labor. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Statutes, WHISTLEBLOWERS.GOV (Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://www.whistleblowers.gov/statutes [https://perma.cc/3G32-HWM5]. 
80. See infraPart V.A. 
81. Peter R. Marksteiner, The Flying Whistleblower: It's Timefor FederalStatutoryProtectionfor 
Aviation Industry Workers, 25 J. LEGIS. 39, 39 (1999) (citing DANIEL P. WESTMAN, THE LAW OF 
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE at vii (1991)). 
82. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012). 
83. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 47, at 633. 
84. See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, "Lifestyle" Discriminationin Employment, 24 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377 (2003). 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
86. See, e.g., Samuel Isacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104 HARV. L. REv. 607, 616-17 
(1990) (reviewing PAUL C. WElLER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990)). However, the Supreme Court 
modified the Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)/Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) 
analysis in a way that finds protected speech of public employees in fewer cases in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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It seems that the statutes have had an effect beyond the situations in 
which they actually provide for recovery for terminations. The proliferation 
of statutory exceptions to employment at will has given rise to expectations 
among both employers and employees that are not consistent with 
employment at will-a sense that all employees must be treated fairly in the 
matter of termination, described as "a new consciousness and assertiveness 
about job security."" 
Finally, at-will employees also have used several tort theories to seek 
recovery for their terminations: invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing," and WDVPP. Professor Mark Gergen divides the torts into what he 
labels as the "collateral torts" applied to termination, on the one hand, and 
WDVPP and breach of the covenant of good faith, on the other." The 
collateral torts, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
defamation, were not specifically created for employment and are not applied 
exclusively to employment." Neither the collateral torts" nor WDVPP92 has 
functioned very well in providing a moderately successful theory of recovery 
for plaintiffs suing for employment terminations. Perhaps this is unsurprising 
in light of the importance attached to the employment-at-will doctrine.93 
This "dazzling and rapidly expanding array" of statutes and common 
law theories protecting workers' rights and interests is different from, and 
perhaps inferior to, a collective bargaining model.94 This approach has been 
characterized as focusing on the individual but not promoting the long-term 
employment relationship and as being "adversarial and atomized."" This 
87. Leonard, supranote 47, at 634-35. 
88. This theory has been treated by some courts as a contract theory and by others as a tort theory, 
and the treatment has varied within jurisdictions over time. See, e.g., Parker,supra note 20, at 354; Peck, 
supranote 11, at 741-43; West, supranote 69, at 13. 
89. Gergen, supranote 21, at 1698-99. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 1694-95 (noting that Texas courts dismiss most such claims at the trial level on summary 
judgment and that the majority of jury verdicts for employees are reversed on appeal). 
92. See Joan M. Krauskopf, Employment Discharge:Survey and Critiqueof the Modern At Will 
Rule, 51 UMKC L. REv. 189,247 (1983). There is not much survey data or empirical analysis ofplaintiffs' 
win-loss rate in WDVPP cases. The oft-cited generalization that plaintiffs do not have a good success rate 
in "wrongful discharge" litigation depends on using the term in the broad sense, not limited to WDVPP. 
See Estlund, supranote 47, at 1673. However, reading many of the decisions indicates that the doctrinal 
uncertainties regarding WDVPP, see infra Parts V.A & V.B, have caused courts to give narrow 
interpretations and often deny recovery. 
93. See infra Part III. 
94. See, e.g., Ellen J. Dannin, ContractingMediation: The Impact ofDifferent Statutory Regimes, 
17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 65, 109 (1999). 
95. Id. 
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patchwork approach also may be criticized for not being coherent or 
knowable to employers and much less to employees.96 
There is a need for additional protection against abusive and wrongful 
termination and redress for discharged employees. This need arises because 
the other types of restrictions on employment at will are inadequate. First, 
only a small percentage ofemployees in the United States are represented by 
unions and/or covered by collective bargaining agreements. 97 Second, 
statutory exceptions to employment at will are specific to particular types of 
terminations, such as race-based discharges or terminations based on 
retaliation for assertion ofprotected rights, and almost all efforts to statutorily 
abrogate employment at will have failed.98 Advocates of a strong 
employment-at-will doctrine undoubtedly will disagree. Others may argue 
that the current patchwork of contract law, statutes, and torts adequately 
restricts abuse by employers of the prerogative bestowed upon them by 
employment at will. I think, however, that many abusive discharges occur 
that our society should not tolerate. The many exceptions to employment at 
will that the law has recognized support this proposition. For reasons that I 
explain below, common law development offers a promising way forward 
through the development of a reimagined tort of abusive discharge, fashioned 
from the existing torts of wrongful discharge in violation ofpublic policy and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
III. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND STATUTORY EFFORTS TO ABROGATE 
OR LIMIT EMPLOYMENT AT WILL 
A. The U.S. StandsAlone 
It often is said that the United States is the only industrialized nation 
with a developed body of employment law that adheres to employment at 
will. With some qualification, that statement is accurate. 99 The comparison 
96. Consider, for example, that it seems likely that many employees do not know the circumstances 
under which they can be legally fired. See Pauline Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information:A Study 
of Worker Perceptions ofLegal Protectionin an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 105, 133 (1997); 
Peck, supra note 11, at 719 & n.. 
97. See supranote 70 and accompanying text. 
98. See infra Part 111.B. 
99. See, e.g., Estreicher & Hirsch, supranote 2, at 347 & 348 n.7 (stating that the at-will rule places 
the U.S. "in a singular position among most other developed countries" and citing numerous other 
sources); see also Befort, supra note 76, at 406 ("The United States stands virtually alone among 
industrialized nations in failing to provide general statutory protection against unjust dismissals."); Peck, 
supra note I1, at 727 & n.48. While these statements are accurate, a more nuanced examination reveals 
that some nations have laws that, while not fully at-will, approach the U.S. law. Israeli termination law is 
characterized as at-will. See, e.g., Guy Davidov, The Principle of Proportionality in Labor Law and Its 
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of U.S. termination law with that of other nations that results in a 
characterization of U.S. law as clearly inferior in providing employment 
security and protection because of the predominance of the employment-at-
will doctrine, however, may be too facile. As Professors Estreicher and 
Hirsch have demonstrated, a more detailed and nuanced approach to 
comparative law considers not just the "law on the books," but also the degree 
of enforcement of those laws and the range of remedies available for 
violations.o For example, Estreicher and Hirsch argue that although it is 
more difficult to win employment claims in the U.S., successful claimants 
often recover much larger awards than those in other nations."o' Although 
they argue that the big wins may mean the U.S. has a more robust array of 
employment protections and remedies, such a system also can be criticized 
as a "uniquely American employment law lottery," in which there are rare 
big winners.' 02 
Employment at will, as the hallmark of U.S. employment law, is both 
one of the most reviled and one of the most sacrosanct principles of U.S. law. 
While many scholars have railed against the doctrine and called for its 
abrogation, some scholars,'0 3 courts, and others defend employment at will 
as an important and perhaps indispensable part ofU.S. law and the nation's 
economy. The chronicle of states' adoption of employment at will and its 
proliferation is discussed above, but many have challenged the maintenance 
of a rule permitting employers such a broad prerogative in terminating, with 
nothing owed to the employee, of one of the most important relationships in 
American society. Professor Epstein is one of the strongest and most often-
cited academic advocates for employment at will.'" His defense of the 
Impact on PrecariousWorkers, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 63, 73 (2012). In Israeli law, however, 
judicial recognition of good faith duties regarding procedures makes it distinct from employment at will 
in the United States. Sharon Rabin Margalioth, RegulatingIndividualEmployment Contracts Through 
Good Faith Duties, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J 663 (2011); see also II.B WILLIAM L. KELLER & 
TIMOTHY J. DARBY, ABA SEC. OF LAB. & EMP. L., INT'L LAB. & EMP. LAWS, 65-32 (4th ed. 2013). 
Canadian law requires employers that terminate without good cause to provide a notice period or 
severance pay in lieu ofnotice. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, JustNotice: Re-Reforming Employment 
at Will, 58 UCLA L. REv. 1, 49 (2010). Thus, employers in Canada may fire without good cause, but they 
may not do it without following any legal prerequisites. Of the twelve nations surveyed by Estreicher and 
Hirsch, the U.S. and Canada are the only nations lacking national unjust dismissal legislation. Estreicher 
& Hirsch, supra note 2, at 445. 
100. Estreicher & Hirsch, supranote 2, at 351 & 355-56. 
101. Id. at 356. 
102. Befort, supra note 76, at 402; see also Gergen, supranote 21, at 1693 ("Wrongful termination 
litigation is seen as a big-stakes lottery with outcomes that correlate poorly with the degree of the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff or the nature of the defendant's conduct."). 
103. Probably the most cited defense ofemployment at will is Richard A. Epstein, In Defense ofthe 
Contractat Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984). 
104. See, e.g., Linzer, supranote 28, at 409 (calling Epstein "the most prominent academic defender 
ofeconomic libertarianism"). 
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doctrine is based principally on a libertarian freedom of contract rationale 
with some law and economics rationale blended in.'o5 Epstein argues, 
essentially, that the freedom of contract afforded by the at-will rule is 
mutually beneficial to employers and employees; "[T]he employer is the full 
owner of his capital and the employee is the full owner of his labor, the two 
are free to exchange on whatever terms and conditions they see fit." 0 6 As 
part of Epstein's broader libertarian and law-and-economics agenda, 
government regulation should be limited and the market forces should be left 
in play.' 7 A cavalcade of critics have challenged many of the assumptions in 
Professor Epstein's defense of employment at will, such as the autonomy and 
bargaining power ofan individual employee.'s Putting the dubious claims of 
autonomy and benefit to the employee aside, the libertarian and law-and-
economics argument contends that permitting employer prerogative aids 
market-based outcomes that are economically efficient.'09 In the words of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, employment at will "is central to the free market 
economy and 'serves the interests of employees as well as employers' by 
maximizing the freedom ofboth."" " One may question whether employment 
at will is so crucial to a robustly performing market-based economy. The 
United States is the only nation that adheres to at-will employment."' There 
are numerous nations that have generally good economic performance 
without employment at will, such as Germany." 2 
Perhaps the United States should end its exceptionalism regarding 
employment termination and come into conformity with other nations by 
105. See Epstein, supranote 103. 
106. Id. at 955. 
107. Epstein views employers and employees as freely choosing at-will terms and concludes that 
"freedom ofcontract tends both to advance individual autonomy and to promote the efficient operation of 
labor markets." Id. at951. 
108. See, e.g., Linzer, supranote 28, at415 ("Epstein's several defenses ofat-will contracts are based 
on incorrect assumptions of both law and fact."); Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an Unjust 
Dismissal Statute in New York, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 1137, 1172 (1989) ("By presenting employment 
relations as though they were purely the product of private choice rather than economic power, 
Professor Epstein's understanding of at-will employment ignores the consequences of disparities in 
economic power and the realities ofeconomic disadvantage."). 
109. Epstein, supranote 103, at 951 ("The principle behind this conclusion is that freedom ofcontract 
tends both to advance individual autonomy and to promote the efficient operation of labor markets."); see 
also Mayer G. Freed & Daniel L. Polsby, Just Causefor Termination Rules andEconomic Efficiency, 38 
EMORY L.J. 1097 (1989). 
110. Bammert v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Wis. 2002). 
111. See supranote 99 and accompanying text. 
112. See, e.g., Michael Kittner & Thomas C. Kohler, Conditioning Expectations: The Protectionof 
the Employment Bond in GermanandAmerican Law, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 263 (2000). However, 
as comparative law scholars such as Otto Kahn-Freund have cautioned, one must be cautious in asserting 
that law that functions well in one society can be transplanted to another society where it will function 
well. See, e.g., Freed & Polsby, supranote 54, at 1138-42. 
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enacting a statute or statutes that require good or just cause for termination. 
The next Section considers such efforts. 
B. Abolishing or RestrictingEmployment at Will by Statutes 
1. AbrogatingEmployment at Will by Statutes: ProposalsandResults 
Legion are the proposals to bring the United States into conformity with 
the rest of the world by enacting statutes that require good or just cause for 
termination.1 1 3 As one commentator expressed it, wrongful discharge statutes 
have been viewed at various times by commentators as the "deus ex machina 
of employment law."ll 4 I will not join the multitude"' who have argued that 
the United States should relent from its rogue status and replace employment 
at will with a good- or just-cause-for-termination statutory regime like that 
of most other nations. Regardless of the merits of that position, such a change 
simply is not going to occur in the United States in the foreseeable future." 6 
I will support that not-so-bold prediction with evidence from the historical 
record and brief consideration of why that record is as it is. Moreover, the 
limited experience in the United States with states that have enacted statutory 
schemes demonstrates that the statutes do not clearly give employees more 
protection or redress than the common law schemes that they replace. Still, 
consideration of both the unsuccessful proposals and the statutes that have 
been enacted is relevant and important both because it substantiates my 
prediction that no more statutes that provide significant protection are likely 
to be enacted and because it accentuates the need for more robust common 
law theories of recovery and remedies. It also demonstrates that the route to 
enactment of legislation has gone first through common law development.' 
Most proposals to statutorily displace employment at will have been 
proposals for states to enact laws, such as the Uniform Law Commission's 
Model Employment Termination Act."' Some, however, have been 
113. See Bird, supra note 18, at 517-18 (describing the prodigious scholarship on employment at 
will). 
114. Parker, supranote 20, at 370. 
115. In an article published in 2004, Professor Bird observed that since 1985, at least 200 articles had 
been published that critique some aspect of employment at will. Bird, supra note 18, at 518. He observed 
that no significant changes had occurred and characterized this as "an area ofemployment law scholarship 
virtually saturated with research that does not sufficiently impact current doctrine." Id. 
116. See id. at 523 (positing that no change will occur because it "would require an immense 
transformation of well-settled statutory and common law"). 
117. See, e.g., Amow-Richman, supra note 48, at 1582 (stating that recognition of a common law 
cause of action "may be a necessary first-step toward securing support for [the proposed] legislative 
reform"). 
118. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Do Wrongful-DischargeLaws ImpairFirm Performance?,52 J. OF L. 
& EcON. 197, 197 n.1 (2009). 
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proposals for Congress to abrogate employment at will by federal 
legislation."' 
To begin with, I think it is almost a certainty that any legislative change 
in employment at will would have to occur at the state level. Employment at 
will, as followed by 49 states, is not federal law; it is state law. Despite 
ambitious proposals for Congress to pass federal legislation abrogating 
employment at will, that is not going to happen. This forbearance is not a 
matter of Congressional authority, but Congressional will and restraint. As a 
matter of federalism, Congress is not going to invade that area of state 
regulation.' 2 0 This is unfortunate because states almost certainly will not 
legislatively modify employment at will because legislators are likely to fear 
that such a change would make them less attractive to businesses compared 
to states that adhere to the doctrine.' 2 ' 
Turning then to the states, only Montana, has enacted a statutory scheme 
abrogating employment at will, and that occurred in 1987.122 It is worth 
noting about the Montana experience both the conditions that prompted the 
adoption ofthe statute and the effect that it has had on the law of termination. 
Employers and their insurers were the principal proponents who lobbied the 
state legislature to enact the legislation, and they did so because employers 
were losing cases under common law theories, principally a "double-barreled 
tort" theory ofWDVPP and breach of an implied covenant of good faith, and 
facing large and unpredictable awards.' 23 These common law innovations by 
the courts in Montana were part of a movement in state courts throughout the 
nation during the 1970s and 1980s. Generally, numerous state courts 
recognized one or more of the following common law theories that narrowed 
the scope and impact of employment at will: implied contract, breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful discharge in violation 
of public policy.' 2 4 However, that period of common law innovation ended 
119. See, e.g., Hirsch, supranote 76; Befort, supranote 76, at 424; Ann McGinley, Rethinking Civil 
Rights andEmployment at Will: Toward a CoherentNationalDischargePolicy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443 
(1996). 
120. See Bird, supra note 18, at 524 ("Perhaps only sweeping congressional action, an extremely 
unlikely possibility given the long entrenchment ofemployment at will, could enact just cause reform."). 
121. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking States Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 
225, 228 (2008); cf Bales, supranote 54, at 463-67 (explaining the widespread adoption of employment 
at will as states' responses to other states' adoption-that is, a race to the bottom of employment 
standards). 
122. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1987). 
123. See, e.g., Leonard,supranote 47 at 664-68; Marc Jarsulic, ProtectingWorkers From Wrongful 
Discharge:Montana'sExperience With Tort andStatutory Regimes, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPL. POL'Y 
J. 105 (1999). 
124. See, e.g., Coley, supranote 68, at 195-96; David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common 
Law Wrongful DischargeDoctrines: Up-Date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 645, 646 
(1996). 
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around the 1990s,1 25 and courts began restricting or recanting on the common 
law innovations. 126 Thus, since about 1990 employment at will has been 
resurgent. Absent development of another significant common law theory 
restricting employment at will, it is hard to imagine that powerful political 
actors would advocate for enactment of such a statute in any state today.1 27 
Moreover, advocates of such statutes should consider that the Montana 
experience has not, by some accounts, produced better recoveries for plaintiff 
employees. 128 
The Uniform Law Commission's Model Employment Termination Act 
("META"), which was promulgated in 1991, has not been adopted by a single 
state.1 29 As Professor Befort observed, the fundamental impediment to 
adoption of the META is that it does not offer employers "an adequate 
tradeoff for their loss of the at-will prerogative."' First, META did not have 
a sufficiently broad preemptive scope because it displaced most common law 
claims, but not statutory claims.13' Second, the remedial scheme under 
META was more expansive than that of most nations with such statutes.'3 2 
In short, no other state in the nation is going to abrogate employment at 
will unless conditions arise similar to those in Montana in 1987, to cause 
businesses to lobby a state legislature for such a change. Businesses eem to 
have adjusted to the existing exceptions to employment at will.' 
125. See Bird, supra note 18, at 578 (stating that "[a]lthough scholarship helped make significant 
inroads in curbing the worst excesses of employment at will, few fundamental changes have been made 
to the doctrine since the heyday of innovation in the 1980s"). 
126. See infra PartIV. 
127. Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution ofUnjust-DismissalLegislation in the UnitedStates, 44 INDUS. 
& LAB. REL. REv. 644, 659 (1991) (stating that "the prospects for passage ofunjust-dismissal egislation 
are linked to the erosion of the common law employment-at-will doctrine"); Parker, supranote 20, at 373. 
128. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 20, at 371-72 ("The Montana statute has essentially gutted 
fundamental common law protections and theories of recovery"). Yet, the law may have produced a better 
regime. See Donald C. Robinson, The FirstDecade ofJudicialInterpretationof the Montana Wrongful 
Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA), 57 MONT. L. REV. 375, 422 (1996) (observing that "the 
Montana WDEA has in fact resulted in a workable scheme that is understandable and predictable"). 
129. See Befort, supranote 76, at 426. 
130. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 76, at 427; Bird, supra note 18, at 197 n.1; Daniel J. Libenson, 
Leasing Human Capital:Toward aNew Foundationfor Employment Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J. 
EMPL. & LAB. L. 111, 113-14 (2006). 
131. Befort, supranote 76, at 427-430. 
132. Id. at 431-32 (positing that states were unlikely to move from employment at will to statutes 
providing greater remedies than the wrongful discharge laws ofother nations). 
133. The adjustments, which have been many, include employing human resource employees and 
employment attorneys, who develop defensive strategies to ward off or prevail in litigation. See generally, 
Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofingthe Workplace: Symbol andSubstance in Employment Discrimination 
Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1999). The rise and prevalence of mandatory arbitration 
agreements is another. See generally, Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Metastasization of Mandatory 
Arbitration, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2019). 
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2. Limiting Employment at Will by Statutes: UsingExisting Statutesand 
EnactingMore 
As discussed above, the United States has many statutes at all levels 
of government that do not displace employment at will but that do restrict it 
to some extent. 13 4 The employment anti-discrimination statutes are the most 
significant body of such statutes. An approach to providing job security for 
more workers is to interpret the existing statutes expansively and/or to enact 
more statutes that declare certain reasons and circumstances to be unlawful, 
thus carving out more exceptions to employment at will. 
Regarding the statutes already in place, courts should not stretch and 
distort existing statutory law and doctrine thereunder to address bad or 
abusive discharges.'13 The employment anti-discrimination laws have 
become, in large part, wrongful discharge laws, with over fifty percent of the 
charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
involving terminations.' When Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
became effective in 1965, more charges were based on refusals to hire,' and 
the shift to a preponderance of termination claims occurred as the law 
achieved a purpose of opening employment opportunities to those to whom 
they had been discriminatorily denied.'13 I think that the employment 
discrimination doctrine developed by courts in case law has been shaped 
narrowly in part by the perception that the discrimination laws have become 
134. See supraPart II.B.2. 
135. Contract law is seldom distorted by courts to provide a remedy for discharged employees. On 
the contrary, as I discuss below, contract doctrine as applied to employment has been warped and 
deformed to deny recovery. There was a period of time, during the 1970s and 1980s, during which some 
state courts stretched contract law to permit recovery, as discussed more fully below. See, e.g., Toussaint 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (finding good-cause contract); 
Wooley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (presuming 
reliance on provisions in an employment manual that employees may never have read). 
136. See EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, BASES BY ISSUE (CHARGES FILED WITH EEOC) 
FY 2010 - FY 2018 (2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcementibases-by issue.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/JHN7-NL8D]. 
137. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
DiscriminationLitigation,43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 1015 (1991) (noting that "hiring charges outnumbered 
termination charges by 50 percent in 1966, but by 1985, the ratio had reversed by more than 6 to 1"); 
Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, IndividualJusticeor Collective Mobilization? 
Employment DiscriminationLitigationin the PostCivil Rights UnitedStates, 7 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 175, 
177-80 (2010). 
138. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 137, at 1015 ("Assuming that concrete improvements 
have occurred, one might expect to see a significant shift in the nature of employment discrimination cases 
as minorities and women no longer need to complain about blanket exclusions from good jobs-that battle 
has, by now, largely been won-but now complain more commonly of being fired from these better 
jobs."). 
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wrongful discharge laws that restrict employer prerogative under 
employment at will.' 39 
I also do not think the enactment ofnumerous additional statutes limiting 
employment at will is the best way or a practically feasible way to provide 
additional protection against abusive termination to employees, although I 
concede that the statutory approach does have some advantages over 
development of common law doctrine.'4 0 Here I am referring to individual 
employment rights statutes, such as whistleblower or lawful activity statutes 
rather than a general wrongful discharge statute. I argue against this 
approach, although statutes have become, in recent decades, the vehicle of 
choice for regulating the American workplace, as evidenced by the cavalcade 
of statutes enacted.' 4 ' I agree with Professor Parker who, in advocating for 
common law development, said that "[1]egislation cannot solve the deeply 
rooted and multi-faceted problems surrounding employment-at-will." 42 
First, enactment of statutes that restrict employment at will is beset with the 
same problem as the ill-fated META and other proposed laws that would 
displace employment at will. As a general matter, it is hard to muster the 
political support to enact statutes that actually are protective of employees, 
although the resistance varies from state to state and over time. 14 Statutes are 
passed not necessarily because they embody good ideas, but because enough 
139. Consider, for example, the bizarre hypothetical invoked by the Supreme Court in Univ. of Texas 
Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). The Court's hypothetical presented an employee who was 
about to be fired or suffer other adverse employment action who might file a frivolous discrimination 
charge and then, when the adverse action occurred, file a retaliation charge. Id. at 358-59. The Court 
concluded that employers would beput to greater costs because they would be unlikely to win on summary 
judgment ifthe standard of causation were but-for. Id. The discussion of the hypothetical was part of the 
rationale for adopting the more stringent but-for causation standard for retaliation claims under Title VII. 
For a fuller discussion of the shaping of employment discrimination law by courts' adherence to 
employment at will, see William R. Corbett, The "Fall" ofSummers, the Rise of "PretextPlus" andthe 
EscalatingSubordinationofEmployment DiscriminationLaw to Employment at Will, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 
372 (1996). 
140. See, e.g., Peck, supra note I1, at 371 ("Legislation would provide more certain and effective 
protection against unjust discharge than slow development ofjob protection injudicial decisions. Statutory 
law is not limited or confined by development within a particular factual context. A well drafted statute 
offers more immediate, comprehensive, and definitive protection. Statutes are more easily understood by 
employees than the law extracted from judicial opinions."). 
141. See, e.g., Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L. REV. 497, 531 
(1992) ("Most of the recent, significant developments in employment law have been accomplished 
through federal and state legislation."). 
142. Parker, supranote 20, at 371. 
143. California, for example, has many state and local laws providing protections and benefits for 
workers. However, even in such a state, business resistance to some worker protections can be significant. 
PrivacyBillfor Employee E-Mail Vetoedfor ThirdTime by CaliforniaGov. Davis,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 195 (Oct. 11, 2001). 
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political support is brought to bear.1 44 Generally, employees have less 
political clout than employers.1 45 In light of this imbalance, when 
employment statutes are enacted at the state level, they sometimes are not 
favorable to employees. Beyond the experience with the Montana Wrongful 
Discharge from Employment Act, 4 6 consider the euphemistically named 
Arizona Employment Protection Act. The Arizona Act was enacted by the 
state legislature, in part, to contain the state supreme court's expansion of the 
WDVPP tort after the court decided Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial 
Hospital.147 The Arizona Act, despite its name, appears to have done more to 
benefit employers than employees, although it is unclear whether it was very 
detrimental to employees.'48 
Beyond the obstacle of mustering sufficient political support to enact 
statutes that actually benefit employees, statutes often have precise language 
and lack the flexibility of common law theories of recovery to address the 
many circumstances that may arise in workplace terminations.14 Louisiana, 
for example, enacted a statutory version of WDVPP.'5 o The statute protects 
specified types of whistleblowing.'"' It also prohibits employers from taking 
reprisal against employees who "[o]bject[] to or refuse[] to participate in an 
employment act or practice that is in violation of law."'52 One of the 
difficulties with the statute is fitting employee conduct within the "object[] 
to or refuse[] to participate in" language. The tort of WDVPP has more 
flexibility because the covered acts are not identified by precise statutory 
language. On the other hand, statutes admittedly do have a number of 
advantages over common law theories, such as "immediate, comprehensive, 
144. Peck, supranote I1, at 751-52; Blades, supranote 12, at 1434 ("Suffice it to say that general 
statutory limitations on the employer's right of discharge are unlikely to be enacted so long as there is no 
strong lobby to support them."). 
145. Peck, supra note 11, at 751-52; Blades, supra note 12, at 1434. 
146. See supranotes 122-128 and accompanying text. 
147. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985). See infra notes 270-277 and accompanying text. See generally 
Marzetta Jones, Note, The 1996 Arizona Employment ProtectionAct: A Return to the Employment-At-
Will Doctrine, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 1139 (1997) (describing the act as the Legislature's response to the trend 
away from employment-at-will that began in the mid-I 980s). 
148. See generally Steven E. Abraham, The ArizonaEmployment ProtectionAct: Another "Wrongful 
Discharge Statute" That Benefits Employers?, 12 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 105 (2008); Jones, 
supranote 147; Jenny Clevenger, Comment and Legislative Review, Arizona's Employment Protection 
Act: Drawinga Line in the Sand Between the Courtand the Legislature, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 605 (1997) 
(stating that the act effected dramatic changes . .. halting, and in some instances, reversing the expansion 
of employee rights in Arizona and severely limiting recovery in tort where those rights are violated). 
149. Consider, for example, the courts trying to decide the issue of whether dating is a "legal 
recreational activity" under New York Labor Law § 201 -d(2)(c). See State v. Wal-Mart Stores, 207 A.D.2d 
150 (N.Y. 1995); McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'g, 89 F. 
Supp.2d 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
150. See La. R.S. 23:967 (2018). 
151. Id. 23:967(A)(1) & (2). 
152. Id. 23:967(A)(3). 
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and definitive protection," and they are more accessible and perhaps 
comprehensible to employers and employees. 153 
In the end, even if statutes provide a superior vehicle for abrogating or 
limiting employment at will, the statutory and common law approaches are 
not mutually exclusive. More robust common law protections are needed. 
First, the track record reveals the difficulty in enacting employee-protective 
laws, so if courts do not act, as they did most conspicuously in the 1980s, 
there is a lack of protection. Second, one of the chief services that common 
law theories provide is that they can, over time, give employers incentive to 
seek a better solution through legislative action, in which both sides may 
receive something, 54 as evidenced by the enactment of the Montana and 
Arizona Acts discussed above. Finally, legislatures seldom write and enact 
legislation on a blank slate; instead, they review and react tojudicially created 
theories.'15 Thus, the development of the common law not only may prompt 
the enactment of legislation, but it also may provide the background and 
education for the drafting of the statutes. Thus, the next Part posits that the 
common law is the most promising source of restricting employment at will, 
but that contract law is not the branch holding such potential. 
IV. COMMON LAW LIMITATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL AND THE 
INADEQUACY OF CONTRACT LAW 
We are decades past the vibrant period of the 1970s and 1980s when 
courts throughout the nation aggressively engaged in the development of 
common law contract and tort theories that restricted employment at will.' 
So vigorous were the courts in some states in creatively developing the 
common law at that time that it has been described as an attack or assault on 
employment at will. 1 Indeed, Walter Olson characterized Professor 
153. See Peck, supranote 11, at 749. 
154. Id. at 752-53; Amow-Richman, supra note 48, at 1581-82. 
155. Peck, supranote 11, at 753. 
156. See, e.g., Bird, supranote 18, at 521-22; Peck, supra note 11, at 725-34; Cavico, supra note 
141, at 497 (describing the "erosion of the conventional employment at will doctrine and the concomitant 
creation of statutory and common law exceptions to its dictate"); Leonard, supranote 47, at 647 ("Over 
the past two decades judicial development of common-law exceptions to the presumption of at will 
employment has been extraordinary... ."); Theodore St. Antoine, ADR in Labor andEmployment Law 
Duringthe Past QuarterCentury, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 411, 412 (2010) [hereinafter St. Antoine, 
ADR] (stating that "beginning in 1980, came a flood of court decisions that ultimately reached every state 
except Florida, Louisiana, and Rhode Island and imposed at least some limitations on the absolutist reign 
of at-will employment"). 
157. It is difficult in looking back on that period to discern what confluence of events, conditions, 
and forces caused such a creative thrust by the courts. Some have posited that the courts acted because 
collective bargaining had collapsed as a regime for regulating the American workplace. See, e.g., 
Summers, Effective Remedies, supranote 42, at 459-60. However, the decline in union representation and 
collective bargaining had been occurring for years before. See, e.g., Robert J. Flanagan, NLRA Litigation 
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Lawrence Blades's important article proposing the tort of abusive discharge 
as having launched an academic assault on employment at will.' 
Interestingly, Professor Henry Perritt sees an article by Professor Clyde 
Summers proposing a wrongful dismissal statute as "part of the genesis of 
the common law revolution in wrongful dismissal law."' So significant 
were the common law developments that, when combined with statutory 
efforts such as the Montana Wrongful Discharge Act and the ultimately 
moribund Model Employment Termination Act, 16 0 several commentators 
predicted the imminent demise of employment at will.16' From today's 
perspective, those predictions appear recklessly bold, as it has been clear for 
a couple of decades now that the common law "assault" on employment at 
will subsided.1 62 Employment at will is stronger now than it was thirty years 
ago,1' as many of the common law developments have been diluted or 
and Union Representations, 38 STAN. L. REV. 957, 981-82 (1986). However, it is plausible that the 
Wagner Act regime had reached a level ofdemise by 1980 that prompted the courts to act. In 1980, union 
density was down to about 18% in the overall workforce (public and private). Id at 981. It also is possible 
that the flurry of legislative enactments, beginning with the Equal Pay Act in 1963 and Title VII in 1964 
and continuing for over a couple of decades, emboldened the courts. See generally Summers, Effective 
Remedies, supranote 42, at 458 ("The trend did not begin with the employment at will cases but can be 
traced back at least to the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA) .... [o]ther acts building upon this statutory trend included the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970 (OSH), and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)."); see also 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 68, at 728 (stating that enactment of civil rights laws in the 1960s "gave further 
support to the concept that unchallenged employer prerogative in hiring and firing decisions had to give 
way to other social interests"). 
158. Walter Olson, The Trouble with Employment Law, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 32 (1999): 
"Lawrence Blades . . . kicked off the modem revolution in state employment law with his article in the 
Columbia Law Review in 1967 launching the attack on employment at will. The resulting intellectual 
insurgency, which soon spread to pretty much every law faculty, was to transform American employment 
law quite dramatically." Id. at 32. 
159. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful DismissalClaims: Where Does Employer Self 
Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 397, 422 & n.129 (1989). 
160. See supra Part IIL.B.L. 
161. Consider, for example, the following prediction from 2000: "The future of employment-at-will, 
then, is that it has no future." Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a 
Doctrine,37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 685-86 (2000); see also Peck, supranote 11, at 4 (predicting the demise 
ofemployment at will); Cavico, supranote 141, at 497 (explaining that the growing momentum of court 
development ofthe public policy tort exception "point[s] to the eventual demise ofthe employment at will 
doctrine"). 
162. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 47, at 1688 ("The argument that wrongful discharge law has 
eviscerated employment at will is simply overstated."); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The Practice of 
International Labor & Employment Law: Escort Your Labor/Employment Clients into the Global 
Millennium, 17 LAB. LAW. 1, 13-14 (2001) ("U.S. employment lawyers say that America's employment 
at will has eroded away, but theirs is a historical, not an international perspective. By comparison to other 
countries, employment at will is alive and well in the U.S."). 
163. Cf Libenson, supranote 130, at 127 (stating that, despite the exceptions, "a powerful ghost still 
looms"). 
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overturned.'" For all the common law developments of the 1970s and 1980s, 
the decades after that were marked by substantial retrenchment. Admittedly, 
one can argue that the ebbing of common law protections is an argument for 
legislative engagement and statutory protections. However, calls for 
legislative solutions and common law solutions are not mutually exclusive. 
Recent history has witnessed more legislative successes, but there is 
opportunity and need for the courts' re-engagement in this area. 
In the last great common law incursion on employment at will, courts in 
various states developed contract, tort, and hybrid doctrines that limited 
employment at will.' 5 Because statutes do not offer a satisfactory or 
sufficient way of imposing additional restrictions on employment at will,' 
what is needed is a second common law thrust. Contract law, infused with, 
and misshaped by, the employment at will doctrine, does not offer adequate 
doctrine for such an incursion. Tort law, although not adequate in its current 
state, has untapped potential to restrict employment at will. 
A. There is a Needfor More Effective Common Law Limitationsof 
Employment at Will 
Before turning to the inherent weaknesses of contract law as applied to 
employment and the untapped potential of tort law, I first address why I think 
we need a more robust common law limiting employment at will. Do we 
really need a second common law "assault" on employment at will? I do not 
think that we need another period of freewheeling experimentation in which 
courts try out various contract, tort, and hybrid theories and remedies as they 
did in the 1970s/1980s. The historical record reveals that most of those 
experiments were rather short-lived, as courts relented 6 7 and legislatures 
stepped in to circumscribe the innovations, as in Montana and Arizona.' 
However, I do think a more effective common law theory of recovery is 
needed for abusive terminations. WDVPP was the most durable and 
prominent survivor from the 1970s/ 1 980s, and that fact suggests that tort law 
164. See, e.g., Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991) (distinguishing 
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)); Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l 
Inc. 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000) (limiting the effect of Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981)); 
Pauline T. Kim, PrivacyRights, PublicPolicy, andthe Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 
680 (1996) ("Despite the many calls for reform, the at-will rule has retained its vitality and, if anything, 
has been regaining strength in recent years."); Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United 
States: The Divine Right ofEmployers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 85 (2000) ("[T]he trend in the last 
ten years has been toward more employer dominance."); see also Parker, supra note 20, at 350-51 
(discussing the scrutiny of employment at will during the 1970s and 1980s, but concluding that courts 
have not developed coherent tort and contract law regarding the doctrine). 
165. See, e.g., Leonard, supranote 47, at 647-67. 
166. See supraPart III.B. 
167. See supranote 164. 
168. See supranotes 122-128 and 147-148 and accompanying text. 
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could be further developed to provide a worthwhile and effective common 
law limitation on employment at will. 
Some would argue that employment at will does not need to be limited, 
as Professor Epstein and Mr. Olson argued during the first assault.169 Others 
would argue that, regardless whether employment at will needs to be further 
limited, common law or tort law is not the appropriate or best way to do it. 7 1 
Regarding the second argument, I have already explained what I see as the 
limitations of statutes.' 7 ' Accordingly, I turn to the first issue-why we need 
additional restrictions of employment at will. 
Termination from employment is a major event in the life of a person 
that, in most cases, has enormously significant financial, psychological, and 
social consequences.1 72 It also harms society because it takes from citizens 
central attributes of citizenship. 7 1 Many, and perhaps most, at-will 
employees likely do not understand that they can be fired for bad reasons; 
that state of the law does not match their expectations. It seems likely that 
this disconnect between understanding/expectations and actual law has 
increased since the passage of so many statutes, such as anti-discrimination, 
anti-retaliation, and whistleblower statutes. Employees are aware there is a 
large and complex body of statutes that provide protection against 
termination under some circumstances, even if they do not know the specific 
protections.1 74 There also likely is a competing notion, however, that 
employees in "protected groups" enjoy job security that other employees do 
not."' From the employer's perspective, the proliferation of statutes has 
placed employers in the position that few human resources departments 
would recommend firing an employee for a bad reason or without 
documentation of a good reason."' Thus, while we may have employment at 
will as our default principle of law regarding termination, our expectations 
and values are not fully consistent with it, and most employers do not operate 
169. See supranotes 103, 158. 
170. See, e.g., Dennis P. Duffy, IntentionalInfliction ofEmotionalDistressandEmployment at Will: 
The CaseAgainst "Tortification" ofLaborandEmployment Law, 74 B.U. L. REv. 387, 404 (1994). 
171. See supraPart III.B. 
172. See supranotes 5-15 and accompanying text. See also Libenson, supranote 130, at 123 (stating 
that among the academic criticisms ofemployment at will, "an important common denominator is that the 
at-will rule essentially gives employers an unchecked right to impose devastating economic and personal 
harms on undeserving individuals"). 
173. See supranote 12 and accompanying text. 
174. See supranotes 94-96; Leonard, supranote 47, at 633. 
175. See supra note 76. Professor Bisom-Rapp has explained that the procedures developed by 
employers in response to employment discrimination laws may enable them to successfully defend claims 
but may not ensure nondiscriminatory employment actions. Bisom-Rapp, supranote 133. 
176. See, e.g., Libenson, supranote 130, at 113. 
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as though they will not be required to give a reason for a discharge."' Indeed, 
society has embraced the norm that certain bad-motive terminations are 
wrong and should be subject to legal redress."' While it is a positive 
development that employers are adjusting their practices, it is a role of tort 
law to enforce societal standards and impose liability when they are 
violated.7 9 Indeed, a common law approach may be preferable to a statutory 
approach when society already has begun to adjust norms and expectations.'so 
The only question then is what bad reasons and abusive terminations should 
be subject to redress and how do we provide that redress. 
Common law theories supplement he statutory bases for ecovery, and, 
as I have argued, they are needed because statutes have substantive and 
practical limits. As the 1970s/1980s period demonstrates, we want common 
law theories ofrecovery to supplement he statutes. It is a function of tort law 
to protect societal values.' Moreover, the availability of common law 
theories of recovery and remedies may obviate resort to anti-discrimination 
and other statutes for bad-reason terminations that do not really fit under the, 
statutes.' 82 Perhaps, in the end, the need for common law theories is obvious 
as Professor Mark Gergen suggested in defending the "collateral torts" 
applied to wrongful termination.' 83 
If one accepts the proposition that additional common law restrictions 
are needed, to which branch of the common law should courts turn? The next 
177. See Leonard,supra note 47, at 637 (arguing that in workplaces regulated by so many rules and 
regulations, the employment-at-will gap filler "is now in considerable doubt"). 
178. See, e.g., Estlund, supranote 47, at 1664 (explaining that the "'bad motive' exceptions at their 
core rest on strong and widely shared moral commitments that reach well beyond the workplace"). 
179. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 834 
(1998) ("The possibility that government will advocate particular patterns of behavior might go some 
distance toward providing a centralizing authority for the enunciation of norms, but unless government 
goes further to provide sanctions, those who are subject to the norm may lack sufficient confidence about 
the compliance of others to make norms as susceptible to rapid change as common law or statutory law."). 
180. Cf Henry N. Butler, A Defense of Common Law Environmentalism:The Discovery of Better 
EnvironmentalPolicy, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 705, 717 (2008) (arguing that "if norms vary from one 
jurisdiction to another, the common law can reflect those differences much more accurately than 
centralized statutory regulation"). 
181. Marshall S. Shapo, In the Looking Glass: What Torts Scholarship Can Teach Us About the 
American Experience, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1995) ("Tort jurisprudence is a relatively accurate 
reflector of American society's basic principles for microgovemance."). 
182. See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the TripartiteDivision ofAmerican Work Law, 28 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 181 (2007) ("Employees who have discharge claims that are compelling 
as a matter of fairness, but which do not meet the requirements of proof under discrimination law, 
frequently attempt to squeeze their 'square peg' of a case into the 'round hole' of the applicable legal 
category, lest the employment-at-will rule bring their action to an abrupt halt."). 
183. See Gergen, supra note 21, at 1694 (stating that "it is self-evident why we might want to 
compensate employees and punish firms or their agents through a tort remedy in extreme cases of cruelty 
or slander"). 
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section addresses why contract law does not have the potential to further 
restrict employment at will. 
B. ContractLaw is Inferior to Tort Law as a Source ofDoctrinefor 
Limiting Employment at Will 
Relying on tort law to restrict employment at will avoids the pitfalls of 
contract law in the employment context. First, employment at will, however 
it is regarded-rebuttable evidentiary presumption, substantive rule-is 
within the ambit of contract law. Employment at will describes the 
termination rules regarding a type ofemployment contract. In order to permit 
recovery for breach of an employment contract, courts must find evidence of 
an agreement between employer and employee that overcomes the 
employment-at-will default. Courts seldom find sufficient evidence of such 
an agreement.' 84 Doctrinally, courts do not have to accept weakening of 
employment at will in the realm ofcontract law to permit recovery under tort 
law.' Tort law, in contrast to contract law, does not depend upon the 
understandings and intentions of the parties. Courts can more readily accept 
a tort remedy, and thus they do not weaken the at-will presumption, because 
they do not have to undermine the presumption of employment at will, and 
they do not have to find that parties agreed to a variation in at-will 
employment; rather, the tort is based on duties implied in law based on 
societal judgments.' A related point is that a tort-based duty cannot be 
divested by an employer's supposed bargaining-and more likely, coercion. 
This is an important advantage because a protection that can be taken away 
by one party's superior bargaining power is not much protection at all. 
184. See infranote 199. 
185. Admittedly, many court decisions have xpressed reluctance to permit recovery under the 
WDVPP theory because of the tort's supposed infringement on employment at will. See, e.g., Bammert 
v. Don's Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Wis. 2002); Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled 
Children, 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Mass. 1992). However, those decisions accord the at-will principle 
importance beyond its contract sphere of influence. As some commentators have explained: 
A rule of contract law has no special place in the decision to recognize a tort for the abuse of 
superior economic position in derogation of public policy.. . . Judicial preoccupation with 
employment-at-will suggests the same sort of underlying bias reflected by the preoccupation 
with privity ofcontract prior to the development ofmodem product liability law. 
WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATIONS: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
137 (2d ed. 1993); see alsoColey, supranote 68, at 215 ("Unlike the implied contract doctrine discussed 
immediately above and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing discussed below, the public 
policy doctrine does not stand in such direct ension with contractual employment."). 
186. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, andthe Low, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REv. 221, 223 (1996) ("[T]he law of torts ... assigns liability for societally imposed, non-contractual 
duties...."); Cavico, supra note 141, at 504-05. Tort law imposes duties on parties in the interest of 
society regardless of the obligations they agree to in contract. See, e.g., Michael H. Cohen, Comment, 
ReconstructingBreach of the Implied Covenantof GoodFaith andFairDealingas a Tort, 73 CALIF. L. 
REv. 1291, 1306-07 (1985) (describing the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as nonconsensual and 
extracontractual and recommending recognition ofbreach of that covenant as a tort). 
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Contract law doctrine and tenets have been savagely distorted in the 
context ofemployment law because of the overwhelming obeisance of courts 
to employment at will.' There are numerous examples. Most courts require 
a precise form of evidence to overcome the at-will presumption and routinely 
dismiss evidence that would be deemed probative of most other types of 
contracts.'" The employment contract concepts of additional consideration 
and mutuality of obligation, which are often invoked to defeat contracts 
alleged to be other than at-will, are corruptions of traditional contract doctrine 
foisted on employment law by courts' passion to preserve employment at 
will.' When Professor Blades proposed the tort of abusive discharge, he 
found it reasonable to bypass contract law because of its rigid doctrinal 
requirements.'" 0 Perhaps this hould not be surprising because employment 
contract formation and termination never has fit well into the exchange 
transaction model of commercial contracts, in which there is a discrete 
transaction and the contractual relationship does not span a long period of 
time with changing circumstances."' The relational contract model, 
developed by Ian Macneil' 92 better accounts for the dynamics of the 
employment contract and relationship.' 
The historical record also suggests that contract law is inferior to tort 
law in restricting employment at will. The contract law innovations of the 
last great incursion on employment at will have not proven durable. The 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has virtually disappeared 
from employment law'94 after a somewhat successful period in the 1970s and 
96 80s.' 95 Many of the contract innovations, such as in Pugh v. See's Candies' 
187. See, e.g., Summers, The ContractofEmployment, supranote 56, at 1097-1102; Cavico, supra 
note 141, at 501-02. 
188. See, e.g., Coley, supranote 68, at 214 ("While a majority of American jurisdictions--roughly 
seventy-five percent--recognize the implied contract doctrine, approximately half of these jurisdictions 
limit the doctrine's applicability exclusively to those cases involving written, rather than oral employer 
representations."). 
189. See, e.g., Summers, The ContractofEmployment, supranote 56; Blades, supranote 12, at 1419-
21; Parker, supra note 20, at 385-89. 
190. Professor Lawrence Blades considered and rejected an implied contract term as inefficacious in 
protecting employees. Blades, supra note 12, at 1421-22 (finding it "reasonable to bypass the law of 
contracts and its unyielding requirement of consideration by turning to the more elastic principles of tort 
law"). 
191. See Leonard,supranote 47, at 663. 
192. See, e.g., Ian Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, andRelationalContractLaw, 72 Nw. U .L. REv. 854 (1978). 
193. See, e.g., Linzer, supranote 28, at 391-94. 
194. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changingthe Employment 
At- Will DefaultRule to Protect Personal Autonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 232-33 (2017). 
195. See, e.g., Rachel Amow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
427,469-74(2016). 
196. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
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in California and Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich.97 in 
Michigan, have been rolled back.'9 In every state, it is now extremely 
difficult for a terminated employee who is not covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement o prove that she has an employment contract that is 
other than at will. 1 99 
Simply put, contract law in the context of employment has been shaped, 
distorted, and dominated by employment at will. Although many 
commentators have decried this corruption of contract law, it is what the 
courts have done. Given both disfigured doctrine and a historical record of 
no enduring effective theory, there is no basis for thinking that courts will 
implement substantial and lasting contract restrictions on employment at will. 
Although tort law has the potential to impose such restrictions, the next Part 
considers weaknesses in the current tort law in the realm of employment that 
renders it unable to effectively harness employment at will. 
V. INADEQUACY OF EXISTING TORT LAW TO APPROPRIATELY LIMIT 
ABUSIVE DISCHARGES 
Among the many bad terminations that occur in the United States, Green 
v. Bryant.o involved what strikes me as among the worst in the reported 
decisions.2 0 ' The case also serves as an exemplar of the weaknesses of the 
existing tort theories that are available to discharged employees. Ms. Green 
worked at a doctor's office. While not at work, she was attacked by her 
estranged husband, who beat her with a pipe and raped her at gunpoint. When 
she reported for work, she was fired, presumably because the employer 
feared that her violent spouse might come to her workplace and injure 
people.202 Ms. Green sued for her termination based on legal theories of 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court denied recovery on all 
theories, granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On her 
WDVPP claim, Ms. Green argued that the public policies implicated were 
protecting an employee's right to privacy and protecting victims of crime or 
197. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980). 
198. See supranote 164. 
199. See, e.g., Summers, The ContractofEmployment, supranote 56, at 1097-1109. The increased 
difficulty is due in part to courts providing guidance to employers to include at-will language in writings 
that they provide to employees, such as employee handbooks. See, e.g., Fischl, supra note 182, at 195. 
200. Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
201. See Schwab, supranote 17, at 1948 (discussing Green as a "striking example" of the doctrinaire 
approach ofcourts in dismissing wrongful discharge cases because they involve private rather than public 
issues). 
202. Green, 887 F. Supp. at 800 n.2. 
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spousal abuse. 203 The court found that plaintiffs termination did not violate 
the public policy favoring privacy because there was no evidence that the 
04employer sought to obtain private information about plaintiff.2 The 
plaintiffs argument regarding protecting victims of crime or spousal abuse 
cited numerous state statutes manifesting the public policy. 205 The court 
dismissed the claim because the statutes relied upon by the plaintiff did not 
create employment rights and privileges and victims were entitled to only the 
benefits or privileges expressly provided for in the statutes.206 The court 
dismissed the intentional infliction claim because it found that the 
circumstances alleged by the plaintiff did not rise to the level of 
07 "outrageous." 2 Regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress, the 
court held that employers do not, when they terminate, breach a duty of 
reasonable care owed by an employer to an employee.208 The good faith and 
fair dealing claim failed because, the court held, there is no bad faith when 
an employer terminates an at-will employee.209 
I think that Ms. Green should have recovered for her termination under 
a tort theory.210 Although the employer had an articulable interest in 
terminating her (fear of violence in the workplace), that interest should not 
have been found to outweigh the competing interests of Ms. Green and the 
public. There are several tort theories, in addition to those pled in Green, that 
can, in appropriate circumstances, be applicable to terminations, such as 
defamation and invasion of privacy. 211 There are only two tort theories that I 
wish to considerm'-wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 
("WDVPP") and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). 
Intentional infliction is one of the "collateral torts" that is not specifically 
applicable to employment termination.213 Stated differently, IIED can apply 
to any type ofconduct that may be characterized as "outrageous"; IIED is not 
applicable to only employment terminations or other employment acts. 
203. Id. at 801. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. (citing Protection From Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6101 et seq; Crime Victim's 
Compensation Board, 71 P.S. § 180-7 et seq). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 802. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 803. 
210. Legislatures sometimes see the need to address situations such as that presented in Green v. 
Bryant. In 2018 California enacted a statute prohibiting employment discrimination against victims of 
domestic violence. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.1. While such statutes can address particular "bad" 
reasons for terminating employees, a common law tort can address a broader range of "bad" terminations. 
211. Obviously, not all terminations will involve facts that even arguably satisfy the elements of 
defamation or invasion ofprivacy. Some, however, do involve such facts. 
212. See Gergen, supranote 21(also discussing defamation and other tort theories sometimes used). 
213. Id. at 1699. 
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WDVPP, on the other hand, addresses specifically and only discharge from 
employment. These two tort theories have been largely unsuccessful for 
plaintiffs, and this is particularly true of IIED.2 14 WDVPP exists in several 
different forms in the many states that recognize the theory.215 It is a tort 
theory that held great promise, but its various iterations, uncertain elements, 
and uncertain connection to identification and preservation of public policy 
have rendered it a poor match for the powerful employment at will doctrine 
that it weakly limits. Despite their weaknesses, these two tort theories have 
the potential to be reshaped and used in ways that impose meaningful limits 
on employment at will. 
A. The Enigmatic Tort of WDVPP: Origins,Foundations,Development, and 
Problems 
WDVPP is a curious case among torts. It is a distinctly American tort of 
relatively recent vintage in the annals of tort law. Most chronicles trace the 
tort's origin to the 1959 California court of appeals decision in Petermannv. 
2 16 Int'l Bhd. Teamsters. The tort did not gain the momentum of adoption by 
many states, however, until after the publication of Professor Lawrence 
Blades's article proposing the tort of abusive discharge in 1967.217 During the 
1970s, a few states recognized the tort, and the number increased 
significantly in the 1980s.2 18Today, all but about nine states recognize some 
version of WDVPP,2 1 9 yet it is nebulous and generally inefficacious.220 
In Petermann,a union business agent sued when his employer fired him 
for refusing to commit perjury in testimony before a state legislative 
committee. The court crafted a common law exception to employment at will 
to permit recovery, stating as follows: 
[I]n order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury, 
the civil law, too must deny the employer his generally unlimited right to 
discharge an employee whose employment is for an unspecified duration, 
when the reason for the dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit perjury. 
214. See Cavico,supranote 141. 
215. Libenson, supra note 130, at 128 ("The breadth of this wrongful discharge tort varies 
tremendously."). 
216. Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
217. Blades, supranote 12, at 1434. 
218. Bird, supra note 18, at 521. 
219. ROTHSTEIN,supra note 68, at 750 (5th ed. 2015). The Rothstein treatise lists Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, New York, and Rhode Island as states that do not recognize the tort, and notes 
that Arizona and Montana have statutes that regulate employment ermination. Id.; see also Charles J. 
Muhl, The employment-at-will doctrine: three major exceptions (2001), at 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/artl full.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PST-LCTE]. Louisiana, however, 
also has a statute that regulates some aspects of wrongful discharge. See LA. R.S. 23:967. 
220. See, e.g., Elletta Sangrey Callahan, The PublicPolicyException to the Employment at Will Rule 
Comes ofAge: A Proposed Frameworkfor Analysis, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 481, 488 (1991). 
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To hold otherwise would be without reason and contrary to the spirit of the 
law.221 
The court seemingly then treated this theory as a breach of contract 
claim, explaining that firing for the alleged reason would be improper 
because it would constitute a failure to act in good faith.2 2 2 Later California 
decisions would characterize the theory of recovery as a tort.2 23 At the time it 
was decided, Petermanndid not clearly look to be the development of a new 
common law limitation on employment at will. 22 4 After some other adoptions 
of the tort,2 2 5 the theory was examined, the case law surveyed, and the tort 
theory adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in 1975 in Nees v. Hocks.2 2 6 
The tort gained academic grounding and more momentum in the courts 
after Professor Lawrence Blades advocated for recognition of a new tort of 
abusive discharge.2 2 7 Blades argued that he power of corporations had come 
to rival that of governments and that it was anomalous that he law placed 
restrictions on government action against citizens but not actions of 
corporations and other employers that result in discharge of employees.2 2 8 
Using the torts of abuse of process and intentional interference with 
contractual relations by a third party as models and the underlying rationale 
of prima facie tort,2 29 Blades proposed a tort of abusive discharge. He posited 
that the proposed tort would provide a remedy when an employer discharges 
an employee in order to effectuate an ulterior purpose, other than that for 
which the right to discharge was designed.230 Although Blades acknowledged 
the argument for the more radical approach of extending all constitutional 
restrictions on government to employers, he saw such an approach as too 
expansive and unnecessary if legislatures enacted statutes or courts 
221. Petermann,344 P.2d at 27. 
222. Id. at 28; see also Schwab, supranote 17, at 1951 (noting that the Petermann court purported 
to find violation of an implied term of the employment contract). 
223. Schwab, supranote 17, at 1951 n.38 (citing later California decisions). 
224. Peck, supra note I1, at 723-24 (stating that Petermannwas viewed as a "'sport' rather than as 
a general modification of employment law"). 
225. See, e.g., Peck, supranote 11, at 723-725. 
226. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975). 
227. Blades, supra note 12. Professor Blades's article has been cited by 88 court decisions and 538 
secondary sources. Walter Olson declared that the article "kicked off the modem revolution in state 
employment law." Olson, supranote 158, at 32; see also Ballam, supra note 57, at 659 (noting that, after 
Petermann,courts in other states did not begin adopting WDVPP until after the publication of Blades's 
article). 
228. Blades, supra note 12, at 1404; see also Cynthia Estlund, Book Review, Rethinking Autocracy 
at Work PrivateGovernment: How Employers Rule Our Lives (And Why We Don't Talk About it). By 
ElizabethAnderson. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press. 2017. PP. X1II1, 196. $27.95, 131 HARV. L. 
REv. 795, 795 (2018) (asking, "How is it that a democratic society devoted to individual freedom came 
to tolerate the private outposts ofautocratic rule and unfreedom in which mostcitizens spend their lives?"). 
229. Blades, supra note 12, at 1423-25. 
230. Id. 
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developed theories to stem the tide of abusive discharges.23 1 Blades's 
approach to proposing a new tort was cautious and conservative, analogizing 
the proposed new tort to existing torts.232 Although Blades's article was 
frequently cited by courts adopting or adhering to the tort of WDVPP, the 
abusive discharge tort envisioned by Professor Blades was different than, and 
probably broader than, the various versions of WDVPP.233 
WDVPP is rooted primarily in the prima facie tort theory of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes and Francis Pollock.234 Holmes's and Pollock's general 
theory provided that intentional infliction of harm is tortious unless the 
tortfeasor can justify her action on policy or ethical grounds.235 Some courts, 
most notably the New York courts, took the general theory of Holmes and 
Pollock and distilled out of it a specific tort called prima facie tort.236 In Nees 
v. Hocks, the Oregon Supreme Court decision adopting the tort of WDVPP, 
the plaintiff, who was fired for not fully complying with her employer's 
instruction that she request to be excused from jury service, pled the tort 
theory of prima facie tort. The Oregon court took note of "the New York 
experience indicat[ing] the difficulties of transposing a very broad principle 
of liability into a specific tort."237 The court eschewed adoption of the prima 
facie tort in favor of recognizing the emerging tort of WDVPP. 3 It is notable 
that torts based on the general prima facie tort rationale tend to be rather 
"formless."239 It was this formless or amorphous nature that, in part, caused 
the Oregon court to refuse to adopt the prima facie tort. However, WDVPP, 
rooted in the general prima facie tort theory, has not fared much better in 
terms of concreteness or certainty of elements.240 
The rise of the tort of WDVPP in the 1970s and 1980s did not occur in 
isolation. This was, as already discussed, the period of the great assault on 
employment at will that led to predictions of the demise of the doctrine. 
231. Id. at 1432 ("If contrary to this assumption, the legislatures or the courts proceed quickly with 
the task ofdeveloping other approaches, it will not be necessary to resort to the drastic yet inadequate step 
of limiting the exercise of private power through recourse to constitutional law."). 
232. See Bernstein, supranote 37, at 1547 n.41. 
233. See Ballam,supranote 57, at 660. 
234. Parker, supra note 20, at 355. On the historical evolution of the theory, see generally Kenneth 
J. Vandevelde, A History ofthe PrimaFacie Tort: The Origins ofa General Theory of IntentionalTort, 
19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 447 (1991). As noted above, the tort also has been cited as an implied manifestation 
in American law ofthe civil law doctrine of abuse of rights. See supranote 41. 
235. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d at 513; Vandevelde, supra note 234, at 447; Gergen, Tortious 
Interference: How It is Engulfing Commercial Law, Why That is Not EntirelyBad, and a Prudential 
Response, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1996) [hereinafter, Gergen, Tortious Interference]. 
236. See, e.g., Vandevelde, supra note 234, at 487-91. 
237. Nees, 536 P.2d at 514. 
238. Id. at 514-516. 
239. Gergen,supranote 21, at 1696-97 (labeling the following torts as formless: invasion ofprivacy, 
intentional interference with business relations, and prima facie tort). 
240. See Callahan, supra note 220, at488. 
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Courts across the nation recognized contract, tort, and hybrid theories that 
permitted recovery notwithstanding employment at will. 241' The incursion was 
not limited to the courts, as state legislatures, to a lesser extent, passed 
employment statutes that limited the rights of employers to terminate 
employees. From that period, WDVPP emerged as the most recognized 
common law restriction on employment at will. 24 2 Just as the tide of change 
ebbed in the 1990s and employment at will began to reclaim its 
prominence,243 the lack of clarity and limited usefulness of WDVPP became 
increasingly apparent. In 1997, Professor Bernstein, in evaluating four "new" 
torts, declared WDVPP to be "the most precarious, the least firmly fixed" of 
the four torts she considered.244 The recognition of WDVPP by over four-
fifths of the states and its inclusion in the Restatement ofEmployment Law 
indicate it is solidly established. However, it is among the most nebulous 
torts, existing in different iterations, and with divergent analyses, scopes, and 
rationales. Several commentators have tried to make sense of the case law, 
while others have proposed modifications. Yet for all its problems, WDVPP 
remains the most commonly recognized discrete common law exception to 
employment at will. What accounts for the tort's weakness? 
WDVPP has been challenging and vexing in at least two key respects: 
(1) the rationale for permitting recovery; and (2) what a plaintiff must prove 
245 in order to recover. There are two basic approaches to the tort.2 4 6 The 
approach followed by a majority of states recognizing the tort begins with 
three or four categories of fact situations: employee is terminated for (1) 
refusing to perform illegal acts; (2) exercising legal rights; (3) performing 
public duties; or (4) whistleblowing. 2 47 Thus, under this approach, recovery 
for WDVPP is permitted only if the fact situation fits into one of these 
241. See supraPartIV. 
242. Mark A. Fahleson, The PublicPolicy Exception to Employment at Will-When Should Courts 
Defer to the Legislature?, 72 NEB. L. REV. 956, 958 (1993) (describing the tort as "[b]y far the most 
widely recognized judicial limitation on the rule"); Parker, supranote 20, at 392 (calling the tort "[t]he 
most widely accepted common law limitation to an employer's broad right to discharge at at-will 
employee"); Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy 
Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1931 (1983) (calling the tort "[t]he most widely accepted limitation 
on the rule"). 
243. See, e.g., Bird, supra note 18, at 522-23 (detailing the denouement of the "veritable open 
declaration of war by courts and commentators on employment at will in the 1970s"). 
244. Bernstein, supranote 37, at 1547. The three other torts she considered were lHED, strict products 
liability, and invasion ofprivacy. Id. at 1541. 
245. See, e.g., Callahan,supranote 220, at 488 (stating that "few decisions involving the public 
policy exception give explicit consideration to the elements of the claim; fewer still address the allocation 
ofburden ofproof'). 
246. See FINKIN, supra note 12, at44. 
247. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 68, at 750. The categories or pigeonholes of WDVPP make it look 
somewhat like the tort of invasion ofprivacy, ofwhich it has been said it is unclear whether it is one tort 
or four different torts. See Gergen, Tortious Interference,supranote 235, at 1697 n.9. 
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categories or "pigeonholes."24 8Some states recognize the tort under only one 
or two of the four fact scenarios. Texas, for example, recognizes only 
wrongful discharge for refusing to perform an illegal act.2 49 Moreover, Texas 
has further limited its recognition to refusal to perform illegal acts for which 
the law imposes criminal penalties. 25 0 States recognizing the categories also 
require a plaintiff to identify a public policy that is implicated in the fact 
situation and require the plaintiff to establish causation between the 
employee's act in support of public policy and the termination. A second 
approach to WDVPP, followed by a small minority of states, recognizes the 
tort when a plaintiff can establish certain elements: 251 (1) clear public policy; 
(2) discouraging plaintiffs conduct by termination would jeopardize the 
public policy; (3) the public-policy linked conduct caused the termination; 
and (4) the employer cannot offer an overriding justification for the 
termination.2 52 The Washington Supreme Court noted the two different 
approaches in Gardnerv. Loomis Armored, Inc., and embraced the elements-
based approach, under which recovery was granted for a fact situation that 
did not fit well into any of the four categories.253 
The American Law Institute's Restatement of Employment Law 
articulated a version of WDVPP that follows the categories or pigeon-hole 
approach.254 The Restatement does add some categories to the four mentioned 
above and adds a catchall category: "engages in other activity directly 
furthering a well-established public policy." Professor Matthew Finkin has 
criticized the ALI's endorsement of this approach as not permitting for 
adequate development and evolution of the law.255 
2 5 6Generally, courts have interpreted WDVPP grudgingly and narrowly. 
This seems attributable to at least two issues. First, in a majority of 
jurisdictions that follow the pigeonhole approach, there is no authority for a 
248. See Schwab, supra note 17, at 1954- (terming this process of categorization "pigeonhole 
analysis"). 
249. See, e.g., Brunner v. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1990); Sabine Pilot, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 
S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985). 
250. ROTHSTEIN, supranote 68, at 753. 
251. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., WORKPLACE TORTS: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES § 3.7 (1991); Perritt, 
supra note 159, at 398-99; Note, Guidelinesfor a Public PolicyException to the Employment at Will 
Rule: The Wrongful DischargeTort, 13 CONN. L. REV. 617 (1981). The number and specification of the 
elements varies, depending on the source. Courts in Iowa, Ohio, Washington, and West Virginia have 
adopted this approach. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 281 (Iowa 2000); 
Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 657-58 (Ohio 1995); Gardner v. Loomis, 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash. 
1996); Swears v. R.M. Roach & Sons, 696 S.E.2d 1, 6 (W. Va. 2010). 
252. The number and statement of elements varies depending on the source relied upon. Callahan, 
supranote 220, at 492-94 & 493 nn. 55-57. 
253. 913 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1996). 
254. RESTATEMENTOF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.02 (2015). 
255. FINKIN, supranote 12, at 44-45. 
256. See, e.g., Callahan,supranote 220, at 515. 
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specified set of elements in a procedural framework.25 7 Second, the central 
rationale articulated for the tort (and from which it takes its name) is that the 
discharge is subject to legal redress not because the plaintiff employee was 
injured by the action, but because permitting the termination poses a threat to 
the public. 25 8 
The search for public policy in WDVPP claims has been described by 
courts and commentators as the "Achilles heel" of the tort.259 "Public policy" 
is an inherently and notoriously vague term.260 A plaintiff must identify a 
clear public policy that is implicated in her termination. Most courts take a 
narrow view of the sources that they deem appropriate to consult for such a 
public policy. Most are reluctant to accept a proposed public policy unless it 
is anchored in a constitution or statute, although in a minority ofjurisdictions 
61 courts take a more expansive view ofwhat may be sources ofpublic policy. 2 
Most courts' reluctance to adopt expansive views of the tort stems from 
two principal concerns. First, WDVPP unequivocally impinges on employer 
prerogative under the employment-at-will doctrine. Although it is true that 
employer discretion is otherwise significantly restricted by many 
employment statutes and ordinances, and most saliently, the employment 
discrimination laws, those restrictions are imposed by legislatures. Judges 
realize that under the WDVPP tort they are second guessing management 
decisions from the bench.262 That concern leads to the second consideration 
that results in the narrow scope. Courts find justification for the second 
guessing of employers by reasoning that the employer's decision is not just 
bad or offensive to the court, but it violates a well-defined public policy of 
the state, which the court must protect. In articulating such clearly defined 
public policies, courts risk the accusation that they are activists who are 
legislating from the bench. Sometimes, state legislatures even perceive it that 
257. Id. at 516-17. 
258. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 17, at 1944 (stating that courts "attempt to cabin [the tort's] 
domain by insisting that the discharge violate public policy rather than involve a mere spat between 
employer and employee"). 
259. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981); see also Ludwick v. This 
Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 223, 337 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1985) ("The difficulty rests in 
determining a precise definition of the expression 'public policy."'); Callahan, supra note 220, at 492 
("Clearly, articulation of an appropriate definition of 'public policy' has vexed courts and commentators 
throughout much of the life of this exception to the at-will rule"). 
260. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. 1981). 
261. See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, supra note 68, at 752 (stating that although early cases often looked 
broadly for public policy, "the more recent trend has been to restrict public policy to legislative sources"); 
Libenson, supra note 130, at 128 (stating that "[mlost states require that the violated public policy is 
'clearly established' in a statute, constitution, or other specific source of law"); Schwab, supranote 17, at 
1957-58 (noting the "recent trend" toward requiring identification of public policy in a statute or 
regulation rather than an "open-ended" or "freewheeling" search). 
262. See Peck, supra note 11, at 749. 
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way and react to such judicial proclamations of public policy.263 Schwab 
points out that the middle-ground approach2 6" of limiting employment at will 
by insisting on jeopardy to public policy results in line-drawing efforts that 
lead to "muddled opinions and contradictory holdings."265 
There is a second part of the search-for-public-policy requirement that 
is seldom discussed by the courts and thus is largely underdeveloped.266 The 
issue has been characterized as the "impact" that the discharge has on the 
identified public policy, or the "jeopardy" in which it places the policy.2 67 It 
is interesting that this issue is rarely discussed by the courts when it is integral 
to the rationale given for recognizing the tort. In most cases it seems likely 
that one discharge, the one at issue in the case, seldom will pose a great threat 
to the implicated public policy. Instead, the impact or jeopardy could be 
forecast through extrapolation, considering what might happen to the public 
policy if many employers terminated employees for the reason at issue. 
Although the issue is seldom discussed by courts, Professor Perritt frames the 
inquiry in the jeopardy issue differently: "[D]ecide if the threat of dismissal 
is likely in the future to discourage the employees from engaging in similar 
conduct."268 However, that seems too broad an inquiry because, as Perritt 
acknowledges, the answer to that question will almost always be "yes."269 
Perhaps no decision is a better exemplar of the difficulties courts face in 
identifying a public policy that is jeopardized by a termination than the 
Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial 
Hospital.270 In that case, an employee who refused to participate in a skit that 
involved "mooning" the audience while singing the song Moon River was 
fired.27' The court, while disclaiming any expertise in the techniques of 
mooning,272 observed that the legislature passed a statute declaring indecent 
exposure to be a crime.273 Accordingly, the court concluded that it was 
"compelled to conclude that termination of employment for refusal to 
263. A conspicuous example of this is the Arizona legislature's enacting the Arizona Employment 
Protection Act in response to the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Wagenseller,discussed below. See 
infranotes 270-277. 
264. The all-or-nothing approaches are adopting a good-cause rule, which abolishes employment at 
will, and strictly adhering to employment at will. Schwab, supranote 17, at 1944. 
265. Schwab, supranote 17, at 1944. 
266. See Callahan,supra note 220, at 494 (stating that this element "is seldom assessed by the 
courts"). 
267. Id. at 493 n.57. 
268. Perritt, supra note 159, at 408. 
269. Id. 
270. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc), supersededby state statute,Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1501. 
271. Id. at 1029. 
272. Id. at 1035 n.5. 
273. Id. at 1035. 
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participate in public exposure of one's buttocks is a termination contrary to 
the policy of this state." 274 
While the discharge in Wagensellermay have been a bad or an abusive 
discharge for which relief should have been granted, the idea that it violated 
and jeopardized a well-defined public policy seems quite far-fetched. First, 
should the court have found implicated by the facts a public policy in a 
criminal statute on indecent exposure? Although the connection certainly 
could be made, it seems tenuous. Second, the question of impact or jeopardy 
is even more troublesome, and the court did not discuss it. Would anyone 
predict that the state of Arizona would be beset with incidents of indecent 
exposure if the court denied recovery in the case? One could respond that the 
question calls for an extrapolation, and if many employers fired employees 
for refusing to moon others, then there could be a rash of indecent exposures. 
However, this whole scenario sounds preposterous. Professor Schwab offers 
Wagenseller as evidence that courts' demands that employees show a 
violation of a public policy manifested in a specific statute can become 
comical, calling Wagenseller "an example of such silliness."27 5 
Wagenseller also demonstrates the "Catch 22" in which the searches for 
public policy ensnare courts. It seems likely that most courts follow a narrow 
approach and look to constitutions and statutes as sources ofpublic policy so 
that they will not be seen as usurping the role of the legislature in declaring 
public policy. 276 Nonetheless, even if a court tethers its declaration ofpublic 
policy to statutes, as the court did in Wagenseller, if a legislature deems a 
court's proclamation of public policy to be overreaching, the anchor of a 
statute may not provide sufficient cover. The Arizona legislature was so 
concerned with the court's decision in Wagenseller that it enacted the 
Arizona Employment Protection Act to rein in the court and preserve a strong 
at-will doctrine.27 7 Indeed, the concern with invading the province of the 
legislature is the very reason articulated by New York courts for not 
recognizing the tort of WDVPP at all.278 
The other dilemma presented by courts' insistence on relying on statutes 
for public policy is the issue of whether a statute creates a private right of 
action. Most of the statutes relied upon do not expressly create a right of 
action. If they did, plaintiffs would be bringing statutory claims under the 
statutes. Thus, courts are being asked to permit a tort claim based on a public 
policy ostensibly manifested in a statute that does not clearly provide a right 
274. Id. 
275. Schwab, supranote 17, at 1959. 
276. See, e.g., Schwab, supranote 17, at 1958; Peck, supranote 11, at 744. 
277. See Jones,supra note 147, at 1140; Clevenger, supra note 148, at 608. 
278. See, e.g., Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 110 (N.Y. 1992); Murphy v. American Homer 
Prods., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983). 
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to sue. A court doing this can be criticized for legislating from the 
bench 279 -essentially the same criticism drawn by courts going beyond 
constitutions and statutes to identify public policy. Thus, if the courts go 
beyond statutes to identify public policy, they may be seen as invading the 
province of the legislature, and if they insist on statutes as sources, they may 
be seen in the same way. 
The courts also express reluctance to adopt expansive approaches to 
identifying public policy because the more expansive approach carves out a 
larger exception to employment at will and, at the extreme, approaches a 
good-cause standard in place of at will.280 
B. The Enigmatic Tort of WDVPP: Rationalizingthe JudicialDecisions 
and/orReforming the Tort 
There have been many attempts to provide a rationale for the analysis 
and results in the decisions. Why did Ms. Green lose? Why did Ms. 
Wagenseller win? What is really going on when a court finds that a public 
policy is or is not violated by an individual termination? 
Considering the array of court decisions, several commentators find the 
public policy rationale of the tort dubious or, at least, not an adequate 
explanation of the decisions. Professor Peck concedes that the question of 
violation or conflict with public policy is considered by the courts, but he 
suggests that the public policy rationale is in part a fagade or "camouflage" 
for courts that believe employees and society are deserving of job 
protection.28 ' As he evaluates the decisions, he posits that the otherwise 
unexplainable variations in the results reflect different judicial beliefs about 
the extent to which courts should provide such protection and/or different 
levels of comfort with the cover provided by the public policy rationale 
against the charge that judges are legislating from the bench a just-cause 
principle for termination.282 Professor Cavico agrees that the public policy 
rationale is subordinate to the goal of reining in the "'lawless' doctrine of 
employment at will "which sanctions conduct inimical to societal welfare."283 
Professor Schwab does not attempt to undermine the public policy rationale, 
but he explains that the public/private distinction is a largely chimerical line, 
and even private disputes between employers and employees have an element 
279. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 17, at 1961 (stating that courts allowing a tort claim "can be 
viewed as supplementing whatever remedies or penalties the legislature has expressly provided in enacting 
the statute"). 
280. See, e.g., Perritt,supranote 159, at 404-07. 
281. Peck, supranote 11, at 749. 
282. Id. 
283. Cavico, supranote 141, at 504. 
107 2020 THEREFASHIONED TORT OFABUSIVE DISCHARGE 
of public interest.284 Schwab posits that a rationale that better explains the 
results in WDVPP decisions is that courts are trying to determine whether the 
discharges have effects on third parties beyond the employer-employee 
relationship.285 The Restatement ofEmployment Law also embraces the third-
party effects rationale.2 86 
Considering the cogent analyses of Peck, Cavico, Schwab, and others, I 
conclude that the jeopardy posed to public policy by a termination is indeed 
relevant to courts' WDVPP applications, analyses, and decisions. 
Nonetheless, that consideration alone does not fully or adequately explain 
what courts are doing with the tort. If public policy is understood in a much 
broader sense, the explanation may be apt. For example, courts could 
conclude that abusive terminations that are motivated by attempts to invade 
and restrict personal freedoms of employees violate public policy, as 
Professor Blades proposed.287 Professor Parker also proposed a broad and 
innovative concept of public policy based on the enforceability of contract 
terms.2 88 Instead, I will diverge from the WDVPP rationale further by 
proposing that violation of general or specific public policy be a major 
consideration, but not the sole litmus test, for a tort theory of recovery. 
Several commentators have suggested that, given the problems with the 
tort and the dubious rationale for its existence, reforms are needed. Some 
commentators think that the answer is to move to a statute that restricts 
employment at will.289 Others have called upon courts to abrogate 
employment at will by announcing some version of a good-cause requirement 
for discharge.290 Still others have called for reform of the tort remedy. An 
innovative proposal by Professor Parker called for keeping the tort of 
WDVPP but changing the definition and scope of public policy: public policy 
would be violated and tort liability would be imposed if a court would not 
enforce a reason for termination if it had been stated in a contract.29 ' 
284. Schwab, supranote 17, at 1977-78. 
285. Id. at 1978. 
286. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01 cmt a (2015) ("A principal justification for this 
public-policy cause of action is that, regardless of the terms of the employment, certain discharges that 
contravene well-established norms of public policy harm not only the specific employee but also third 
parties and society as a whole"). 
287. Blades, supranote 12, at 1406-07. 
288. Parker, supranote 20, at 402-05. 
289. See, e.g., Perritt,supranote 159, at 427-30. 
290. See, e.g., Peck, supranote I1, at 773; Cavico, supranote 141, 531-32; Leonard, supranote 47, 
at 673, 680-83. 
291. Parker, supranote 20, at 402-05. Parker's proposal is somewhat similar to Professor Schwab's 
third-party effects theory. Schwab posited that courts would refuse to enforce a contract term by which 
the parties agree to further their own interests and ignore deleterious effects on third parties. Schwab, 
supra note 17, at 1952-53.. 
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My proposal calls for a reformed tort theory ofrecovery with principles 
drawn from existing tort theories. Before turning to that proposal, however, 
I consider the application of IIED to terminations because that theory of 
recovery is the other tort theory relevant to my proposal. 
C. IIED: TerminationsThat Civilized Society Will Not Tolerate 
IIED is not a tort that was designed for employment law or terminations, 
as was wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The tort emerged 
from efforts to unleash parasitic damages for emotional distress from other 
torts. Before the recognition of the freestanding tort of IIED, emotional 
distress damages could be recovered only if some other damage could be 
established under some existing tort theory.292 The work of academics, 
including Professors William Prosser and Calvin Magruder,29 3 and the 
enshrinement of RED in the Restatement (Second) of Torts294 prompted 
courts' recognition of IIED or the tort of outrage. IED is now officially 
recognized in all but two states, and the highest courts of those states seem 
receptive to recognizing the tort under appropriate facts.295 
IIED is perhaps the most nebulous of all intentional torts,296 requiring 
"extreme and outrageous conduct" that "goes beyond the bounds of human 
decency such that it would be regarded as intolerable in a civilized 
292. See, e.g., Russell Fraker, Note, Reformulating Outrage:A CriticalAnalysis of the Problematic 
Tort oflIED, 61 VAND. L. REV. 983, 987 (2008). 
293. See, e.g., Gergen,supranote 21, at 1705 (discussing the work ofProsser and Magruder); Martha 
Chamallas, DiscriminationandOutrage: The Migrationfrom Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY 
L. REv. 2115, 2151 (2007) (describing TIED as "a tort created by academics" and citing the work ofProsser 
and Magruder); see also Duffy, supra note 170, at 393 n. 17 (recognizing role of academic advocacy in 
recognition of the tort and citing several influential law journal articles). 
294. Chamallas, supra note 292, at 2151 (citing the recognition of lIED as a separate tort in the 
Restatement (Second) as the "official birth" of the tort). 
295. In 1994, Professor Dennis Duffy stated that only Michigan, Montana, and Pennsylvania did not 
recognize the tort. See Duffy, supranote 170, at 390 n.7. Since that time, Montana has recognized the tort. 
See Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411 (Mont. 1995). The Michigan Supreme Court 
has never officially recognized IIED, but has suggested that it might under an appropriate set offacts. See 
Hubbard v. Prison Health Servs., No. 10-14390, 2011 WL 4373981 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2011) (citing 
Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 905 (1985)). Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has never recognized the tort, but it has indicated receptiveness to the Restatement (Second) elements as 
the minimum requirements. See Wilson v. American General Finance Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 291, 302-03 
(W.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Taylor v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 754 A.2d 650,653 (Pa. 2000)). In a dissenting 
opinion, a Michigan Supreme Court justice noted that only two states' highest courts have not definitively 
recognized IIED. Melson v. Botas, 863 N.W.2d 674, 674 (Mich. 2015) (Markman, J, dissenting). 
296. See, e.g., Frank J. Cavico, The Tort ofIntentionalInfliction ofEmotional Distress in the Private 
Employment Sector, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 116-17 (2003) [hereinafter Cavico, The Tort of 
IntentionalInfliction] (discussing that "outrageousness" lacks a specific definition); Gergen, supra note 
21, at 1695 (stating that what employers fear about IIED is the unknown and describing IED as one of 
the formless torts); Alex B. Long, Lawyers Intentionally Inflicting Emotional Distress,42 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 55, 60 (2012) ("[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to state with precision what actions qualify as 
extreme and outrageous"). 
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community." 2 97 Nonetheless, it has been a largely unavailing theory for 
98 plaintiffs generally. 2 Indeed, the Restatement (Second), while giving its 
imprimatur to the tort, bestowed the initial weakness that it still bears: 
"Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some 
degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living 
among people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so 
severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it." 299 Thus, IIED 
is paradoxically one of the potentially most broadly applicable torts and a tort 
theory that courts have been most reluctant to apply broadly.300 
As difficult as it has been for plaintiffs generally to recover for IED, 
plaintiffs in employment cases, particularly those involving terminations, 
have found courts particularly reluctant to permit recovery.301 As with 
WDVPP, courts fear permitting a substantial tort incursion on employment 
at will.302 Some courts adopting such a restrictive approach to IIED have cited 
a comment in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "The actor is never 
liable .. . where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a 
permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain 
to cause emotional distress."303 Believing that employment at will is a 
sacrosanct principle of law, some courts fear that permitting recovery for one 
297. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. 
d (AM. LAW INST. 2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d. (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
298. See Fraker,supranote 292, at 984 & 996 (describing it as a disfavored cause ofaction and "the 
tort of last resort"); Long, supranote 296, at 56 (quipping that IED is "predictable in the sense that most 
plaintiffs lose"). 
299. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j. (1965). 
300. See Chamallas,supranote 292, at 2117 (noting that IIED represents both "expansive protection" 
of tort law and courts' "considerable reluctance ... to intrude upon other areas of law"). 
301. See, e.g., Gergen,supranote 21, at 1695-96. 
302. In 1994, Professor Duffy declared that "the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions either do 
not recognize the tort in the employment at will context, or place severe restrictions on liability in that 
context." Duffy, supranote 170, at 391; see also Gergen, supranote 21, at 1702 ("Despite the apparent 
openness of the tort, infliction claims by employees rarely succeed."); Cavico, The Tort ofIntentional 
Infliction, supra note 296, at 157-58 (describing reluctance of courts to permit IIED to be used as a 
backdoor wrongful discharge claim). Although there has been some expansion ofapplication of IIED to 
terminations in some states since Duffy's statement, there is still considerable reluctance on the part of 
courts. 
303. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (2012) ("An actor can intentionally or recklessly cause severe emotional 
harm while exercising a legal right. For example, a spouse who seeks a divorce or an employer who 
terminates an at-will employee might be substantially certain that the conduct will cause severe emotional 
harm, but neither is liable for that conduct Otherwise, the tort of intentional infliction ofemotional harm 
would undermine well-established principles of marital law and employment law."); Chamallas, supra 
note 292, at 2117 (describing "a considerable reluctance on the part ofcourts to intrude upon other areas 
of law or to interfere with what is perceived to be an exercise of the defendant's legal rights"); Gergen, 
supra note 21, at 1706 (explaining that ITED was not vexing until cases presented the question "whether 
liability might exist for conduct that is privileged or immunized under another body of law"). 
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termination case under IED will open the floodgates and jeopardize 
employment at will."* 
The Texas courts are representative of the restrictive approach to IIED 
applied to workplace claims and terminations, and plaintiffs asserting IIED 
claims for workplace incidents have lost most such cases.30 s The Texas 
Supreme Court explained this approach in GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce: 306 
"[T]o properly manage its business, an employer must be able to supervise, 
review, criticize, demote, transfer, and discipline employees. Although many 
of these acts are necessarily unpleasant for the employee, an employer must 
have latitude to exercise these rights in a permissible way, even though 
emotional distress results."307 The court in GTE Southwest cited numerous 
Texas cases following the restrictive approach.30 8 Yet, the Texas Supreme 
Court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiffs on an lIED claim, given the 
supervisor's "repeated" and "ongoing harassment" of his subordinate 
employees.30 9 GTE Southwest was not a termination case, but it did slightly 
liberalize the standard for outrageous conduct in Texas in the workplace 
setting. Yet, the principle that courts should rarely permit a successful IIED 
claim for employment termination remains vibrant in Texas case law after 
GTE Southwest."o The idea that a termination, even if not executed as well 
as might be hoped, is not outrageous because of employment at will persists 
in all states." Discharged employees are almost never going to recover for 
IIED.312 
On the other hand, the Restatement (Third) takes the position that just 
because one is exercising a legal right, "the actor is not immunized from 
304. See, e.g., Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. 1992) 
(finding "there would be little left of the employment-at-will doctrine" if the court permitted recovery 
under IIED). 
305. See Duffy, supra note 170, at 404-11; Gergen, supra note 21, at 1728-30; Cavico, The Tort of 
Intentional Infliction, supra note 296, at 120-22. 
306. 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999). 
307. Id. at612. 
308. Id.at611-13. 
309. Id. at 616. 
310. See, e.g., City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex. 2000); Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. 
v. Franco, 971 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. 1998); Gergen, supranote 21, at 1703 (stating, before GTE Southwest 
was decided, that "conduct which normally or naturally occurs in a termination cannot be considered 
morally outrageous as a matter of law"). 
311. See, e.g., Winters v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., No. CV075012082S, 2008 WL 803134 
(Conn. 2008) (finding that "while [employer's] method of terminating the plaintiff may have been a 
callous, insensitive and unjustifiable course ofconduct, a jury could not find that it was "'so extreme and 
outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency in a civilized community'); Harris v. Ark. Book, 
Co., 700 S.W.2d 41,43 (Ark. 1985); Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc., 272 P.3d 1263, 1274 
(Idaho 2012); Pratt v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 500 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (Ill. 1986). 
312. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 17, at 1976 (stating that scholarly commentary "has recognized 
that employees rarely can win emotional distress claims"). 
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liability if the conduct goes so far beyond what is necessary to exercise the 
right that it is extreme and outrageous."3 13 Thus, a discharge carried out in a 
humiliating way may satisfy the standard of outrageous conduct.314 
VI. A REFASHIONED TORT: ABUSIVE DISCHARGE 
A. The Tort 
As certainly as American law has embraced employment at will as the 
foundational and default rule for employment terminations, it is clear that 
there are terminations that are so unfair that our society will not countenance 
them without providing legal recourse.' The fundamental notion that there 
are some "bad motive" terminations that will not be tolerated by the law is 
based on widely shared moral commitments,"'6 and is well established 
alongside employment at will. The statutory bad-motive exceptions to 
employment at will have expanded since the 1960s;"' thus, it is clear that the 
bad-motive terminations that society is unwilling to accept without redress 
have been expanding. 
As the statutory exceptions to employment at will expanded, we 
experienced an expansion of common law exceptions for a period of years 
followed by contraction. Yet, the common law exceptions persist, and 
WDVPP continues to be recognized in over eighty percent of the states.318 I 
think that common law exceptions play a vital and indispensable role in 
employment law in the United States." The common law exceptions are 
needed because the statutes clearly do not cover all terminations that our 
society finds intolerable.320 The common law exceptions also are needed so 
that discharged employees are not given the perverse incentive of trying to 
force their claims under statutes that do not really fit their circumstances. 
Furthermore, the common law exceptions sometimes are the precursors to 
statutory exceptions, as legislators seldom write employment laws on a blank 
slate. 
313. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e. (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
314. Id. See, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976). 
315. See, e.g., Donald C. Carroll, At-Will Employment: The Arc of Justice Bends Towards the 
Doctrine'sRejection, 46 U.S.F. L. REv. 655 (2012). 
316. Estlund, supranote 47, at 1664. 
317. Title VII was enacted in 1964, but its effective date was July 2, 1965. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716, 78 Stat. 241, 266 (stating that the effective date shall be one year after the date 
of enactment). 
318. See supranote 219. 
319. See supraPart IV.A. 
320. See Leonard,supranote 47, at 648 ("Tort exceptions reflect a concern that unbridled operation 
of an at will presumption may undermine important public policies ... or that it may encourage behavior 
inconsistent with current community standards of civility and respect for human dignity."). 
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Now, some thirty years after the great assault on employment at will 
subsided around 1990, it is time to expand the common law exceptions again. 
This is so because the common law exceptions have fallen into such disrepair 
since the innovations of the 1970s/1980s. This time, however, rather than 
courts developing a variety of contract and tort theories, they can engage in 
a more focused effort based on the results of the earlier period. As discussed 
above, contract law is not a body of common law conducive to developing 
effective exceptions to employment at will.32 ' Instead, tort law has the 
potential to provide an effective common law theory ofrecovery for abusive 
terminations. In 1996 Professor Gergen defended the role of the "collateral 
torts" (IIED and others) applied to terminations as essentially patrolling the 
outer perimeter of employment law and providing recovery in only the most 
egregious cases.32 2 There is still a need for this last guardian against abusive 
discharges-one that is not constrained by the specifics ofstatutory language 
and one that can express the disapproval of society based on shared values 
on a case-by-case basis. 
I once argued for a more vigorous and expansive application of IIED to 
discharges, with courts finding the standard of "outrage" satisfied if the 
discharge was on the periphery of a violation of employment discrimination 
law,3 23 such as terminations involving issues of sex and/or appearance. I now 
acknowledge that IIED cannot be reconceptualized and repurposed to address 
abusive terminations. The large body of case law finding that discharges are 
not outrageous because employers are exercising their lawful right is too 
powerful to overcome and is supported by the comments to the torts 
32 4Restatements. 
I now think that courts should abandon the tort theories that have been 
ineffective, amorphous, and vexing. They should declare that recovery will 
not be permitted under IED and WDVPP for employment terminations. 
What is needed and supported by the development and evolution of the law 
is essentially a fusing of the two torts of WDVPP and WED into the 
321. See supraPart IV.B. 
322. Gergen, supra note 21, at 1699 n.17. Professor Givelber views the tort of IED as providing a 
vehicle for dealing with the occasional hard case where enforcement of the normal legal rules or principles 
produces a result that seems terribly wrong. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum SocialDecency and 
the Limits ofEvenhandedness: IntentionalInfliction ofEmotionalDistress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 
CoLUM. L. REV. 42, 75 (1982). 
323. See Corbett,An OutrageousResponse, supranote 31. 
324. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (TItRD) OF 
TORTS § 46 cmt. e (2012). 
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refashioned32 5 tort of abusive discharge.326 I respectfully take the name for the 
tort proposed by Professor Blades. I think the tort I propose is close to what 
he envisioned, although perhaps broader. 
Professor Peck has explained the WDVPP decisions in part as the courts 
providing the job security to which they believe employees are entitled and 
which society deserves.3 27 Because courts are called upon to second guess 
business judgments of employers,3 28 they feel most secure doing this under 
the guise or camouflage of public policy, and they feel least comfortable 
doing so when they find discharges for socially reprehensible reasons.3 29 The 
result is the enigmatic tort of WDVPP. Courts should stop this charade. They 
are not just protecting the public from an employer threatening public policy; 
they are second guessing employers on termination decisions. 
Notwithstanding the employment-at-will doctrine, that is a proper role for 
courts applying tort law. Employment at will is, in most states, common law 
doctrine.330 Moreover, it is best described as a rebuttable presumption about 
the employment contract. Employment at will should not control tort 
doctrine, and courts are fully competent o interpret and modify common law 
doctrine."' Indeed, is remarkable that a "mere" rebuttable presumption and 
default rule of contract law has impacted the development of tort law so 
substantially. Courts should recognize that this is neither necessary nor 
appropriate. 
Tort law is about imposition and enforcement of duties that reflect 
societal values. Courts should unabashedly address the question of whether 
a particular termination is one that should not be tolerated by society. A 
fusing of the torts of IED and WDVPP would equip them to do this candidly 
without the disguise afforded by the public policy rationale of WDVPP. 
Professor Gergen argued that the outrage standard "allows new moral values 
325. Mindful of the admonition of Professor Bernstein about the three paradoxes that stand in 
opposition to the success ofnew torts (novelty, torts, and agency), I submit that I am not proposing a new 
tort, but instead fusing two existing torts and making sense of the case law and doctrine for those torts. 
See Bernstein, supra note 37, at 1544. 
326. As discussed above, "wrongful discharge" would not serve well because the tort would be 
burdened with the legacy and baggage of the tort of WDVPP. See supraPart V.A. 
327. Peck, supranote 11, at 749. 
328. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Where There's At-Will, There Are Many Ways. Redressing the 
IncreasingIncoherence of Employment at Will, 67 U. PITr. L. REv. 295, 300 (2005) ("[C]ourts do not 
show the uniform fealty to employment at will that they profess"). 
329. Id. 
330. The courts would have a harder task in states in which there is some statutory basis for 
employment at will, such as Louisiana, Georgia, and Arizona. 
331. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 47, at 638-39 ("We expect the state courts to play this role in 
dealing with private disputes: to identify principles which are congruent with the reasonable expectations 
of the parties and the society in which they interact, building on existing bodies ofprecedent and theory."); 
Parker, supra note 20, at 401-02 (arguing that judges should begin to ascertain public policy "to further 
the goals of integrating tort and employment principles"). 
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to be woven into the fabric of the common law."332 However, as discussed 
above, courts have rendered the "outrage" standard of IIED beyond the reach 
of almost any employment termination. Nonetheless, the tort of IED still 
may have something to offer. A variation on the standard is included in the 
Restatements' comments: conduct that is "intolerable in a civilized 
community."" That iteration comes closer to the mark of the standard that 
courts should apply for abusive discharge. 
For the tort of abusive discharge, there should be only two elements: 
proof of a discharge3 34 and evaluation of abusiveness, meaning analysis of 
whether the discharge should be tolerated by society ("tolerance standard"). 
It is appropriate that a court should apply a tort standard that is calibrated to 
societal values. 3 I do not think that there should be a separate element of 
justification, as in the elements-based approach to WDVPP, in which an 
employer can provide an overriding justification to defeat liability.336 Instead, 
an employer's argument ofjustification is appropriately considered under the 
tolerance standard. The answer to the question whether society should 
tolerate a termination should be resolved, as under many other tort standards, 
by balancing of the relevant interests-interests of employer, employee, and 
society. Professor Blades argued that society has an interest in protecting 
employees from termination regarding matters that are not their employers' 
business.337 As applied by most courts, the tort of WDVPP, with its rigid 
insistence on jeopardy to public policy manifested in statutes, has devalued 
the interest of the employee and taken an unnecessarily cramped view of the 
relationship between the employee's interest and the interest of society." 
Under the proposed tolerance standard, in performing the balancing test, 
courts could and should, in appropriate cases, take into account several 
different considerations that various courts have considered in their decisions 
evaluating terminations under WDVPP and IIED. For example, courts could 
consider whether a public policy is implicated by the termination. Critiques 
332. Gergen, supra note 21, at 1709. 
333. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d. (1965). 
334. As explained above, I do not propose extending the tort to adverse employment actions other 
than terminations. See supra note 36. However, I do propose that constructive discharge satisfies this 
element. Most states that recognize WDVPP do permit claims for constructive discharge. See 
RESTATEMENTOF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.01 cmt. c (2015). 
335. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 47, at 648 ("Tort exceptions reflect a concern that unbridled 
operation ofan at will presumption may undermine important public policies ... or that it may encourage 
behavior inconsistent with current community standards ofcivility and respect for human dignity"). 
336. See supranote 252. 
337. See Blades, supranote 12, at 1432-34. 
338. Id. at 1410 (advocating for tort recovery "for the sake of providing specific justice for the 
afflicted individual, deterring a practice which poses an increasingly serious threat to personal freedom 
generally, or instilling into employers a general consciousness of and respect for the individuality of the 
employee"). 
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of the case law under WDVPP, discussed above, do not reject or disparage 
the idea that the courts were concerned with a public policy."' Instead, those 
critiques posit that insistence on identification of a clear public policy and 
jeopardy to that policy as the sine qua non of the tort theory fail to explain 
the decisions. Courts should consider whether a public policy is implicated, 
but this is only one consideration, and not dispositive, under the overarching 
standard. Courts also should consider factors such as third-party effects, 
which, as Professor Schwab points out, is an appropriate consideration for 
tort law.340 Whether the reason for the termination would be enforceable if it 
had been included as a term of an employment contract341 also could be 
considered under the tolerance standard, as suggested directly by Parker and 
indirectly by Schwab, both because it is relevant to employer and employee 
interests and it helps in the evaluation of third-party effects.342 I think courts 
also should evaluate whether a termination would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable employer and employee. This standard is similar to that used for 
the invasion of privacy tort of intrusion on seclusion.3 43 It also is similar to a 
standard used under employment discrimination law to evaluate whether 
conduct rises to the level of sexual harassment.3 44 The employer and 
employee perspectives are appropriate considerations because both parties 
have interests worthy ofprotection, which should be balanced along with the 
3 45interest of society. In a case such as Green v. Bryant, for example, a court 
would conclude that a termination of a woman because she had been beaten 
by a spouse or partner should not be tolerated by society by weighing the 
interests of the employer, employee, and society, rather than requiring that a 
specific public policy be jeopardized by the termination. 
The tort of IED offers a factor that should be considered under the 
tolerance standard. One of the markers of outrageous conduct under IED is 
abuse by the tortfeasor of a position of authority over the tort victim.346 While 
employers necessarily have a position of authority over employees whom 
they discharge, whether the exercise of authority is intolerable by societal 
standards may be considered in light of the characteristics of the employment 
relationship and the degree of imbalance ofpower. For example, an employer 
339. See supraPart V.A. 
340. Schwab, supranote 17, at 1972-75. 
341. Parker, supra note 20; see also Wieder v. Skala, discussed supranote 278. 
342. I must admit some trepidation with incorporating references to contract law, given the many 
ways that contract principles have been distorted by employment at will. See supraPart IV.B. Nonetheless, 
the query seems relevant and it is supported by case law, such as the Wieder case. See Wieder, supranote 
278, at 107. 
343. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
344. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
345. 887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1995), discussed supra Part V. 
346. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e. (1965). 
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that terminates a managerial employee who has worked for the employer for 
decades may leave the employee with few options for a comparable job. For 
example, a California court considered the number of years of service and 
347 level of accomplishment of the employee in Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. 
The employee's service was considered in Pugh under an implied contract 
theory. However, even California has backed away from the importance of 
the employee's service as a factor in the contract analysis.348 Because the 
relational contract theory349 has not flourished in employment law, I propose 
that courts consider the characteristics of the relationship, such as longevity 
and quality of service under tort law in determining whether a termination 
should be tolerated by society. I think this factor is consistent with the 
imbalance-of-power factor under IIED and Professor Green's relational tort 
theory.350 
In the courts, a weakness of IIED has been that courts often grant 
summary judgments, preventing the question of whether conduct meets the 
standard of outrage from reaching the jury.351 It also seems that a 
disproportionate percentage of WDVPP claims are dismissed on summary 
judgment, perhaps because courts consider it their province to determine 
whether a public policy is implicated. Under the proposed tort of abusive 
discharge, the tolerance standard calls for application of a standard of what 
conduct is tolerated by society, and it is appropriate that it be resolved by the 
fact finder, except in cases in which reasonable people could not disagree. 
One situation in which public policy is implicated is when a termination 
is on the periphery of being actionable under other employment laws. For 
example, the Iowa Supreme Court did not permit a dental hygienist to recover 
for sex discrimination when her employer fired her so that he would not try 
to have an affair with her (and because his wife gave him an ultimatum) in 
Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C.352 Although the Iowa court may have 
been correct to deny recovery for sex discrimination, the case teetered on the 
brink of being actionable as sex discrimination. The tort of abusive discharge 
could provide recovery for cases in which a statute is arguably violated, but 
the statute and case law thereunder do not have to be stretched to permit 
recovery. Under the tort analysis of abusive discharge that I propose, I think 
that a court should find that the termination in the Nelson case is one that 
should not be tolerated by society. A public policy is implicated even if the 
347. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). I am aware that the employee lost the case on 
remand in Pugh. 250 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
348. See Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1105 (2000). 
349. See supranotes 192-193 and accompanying text. 
350. See supranote 28. 
351. See, e.g., Gergen,supranote 21, at 1694-95. 
352. 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013). 
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sex discrimination is not established based on the doctrine developed in case 
law under the statute. It seems likely that the termination would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable employer and employee. Moreover, the potential 
for third-party effects should be clear in a case bordering on sex 
discrimination and sexual harassment. The recognition of hostile 
environment claims and sexual harassment claims by persons who were not 
targets of the alleged harasser's conduct353 indicate the law's concern with 
third-party effects. In the balancing of interests that occurs under the 
tolerance standard, the employee's and society's interests should outweigh 
the employer's justification. 
It is worth noting that, because employers increasingly have resorted to 
requiring employees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements,354 with the 
imprimatur of the Supreme Court on the enforceability of such agreements,"' 
many claims asserting this tort likely would be decided by arbitrators. There 
is great concern among employee rights advocates about employees being 
forced to arbitrate their employment claims.356 Research indicates that 
employees do not fare as well in arbitration as employers do." This is not a 
concern unique to this tort, as mandatory arbitration agreements typically 
cover all claims arising out of employment disputes, including statutory 
claims. However, the common law claim lacks the additional check on 
employers that comes with a federal agency that can assert the statutory 
claims in court that the employees themselves are precluded from asserting, 
as the EEOC can do with federal employment discrimination claims.5 With 
fewer employment claims being litigated in the courts because of mandatory 
arbitration, courts would have fewer opportunities to recognize abusive 
discharge and to develop the doctrine than courts had in the 1970s and 1980s 
353. See, e.g., Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798 (11th Cir. 2010). 
354. See, e.g., Colvin, supra note 133, at 23 (noting that employees in over 50% of American 
workplaces are subject to mandatory arbitration); St. Antoine, ADR, supra note 156, at 414. 
355. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). 
356. See generally St. Antoine, ADR, supranote 156, at 415-17; see, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity 
Comm'n Notice No., 915.002, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment 
Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, Section V.B. (July 10, 1997), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html [https://perma.cc/9CHD-NB4A]. The EEOC, in a 
divided vote, rescinded this position in December 2019. Erin Mulvaney, EEOC RescindsPolicy Against 
Binding Arbitrationfor Workers, Daily Lab. Rep. (Bloomberg) (Dec. 17, 2019). 
357. See, e.g., Colvin, supranote 133, at 22 (citing Alexander J.S. Colvin, EmpiricalResearch on 
Employment Arbitration: ClarityAmidst the Sound andFury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 410 
(2008)). 
358. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297-98 (2002); EEOC v. Circuit City, 
285 F.3d 404, 407 (6h Cir. 2002). 
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when WDVPP was being adopted and developed.359 There are legislative 
proposals at federal and state levels, such as the Arbitration Fairness Act, 
introduced in Congress multiple times, including 2017360 and 2018,361 which 
would render predispute mandatory agreements unenforceable. The tort that 
I propose has a better chance of initial adoption and subsequent development 
if employees are able to assert their claims in courts. 
B. Objections to the RefashionedTort 
As with all proposals, there are many possible objections. I will address 
what seem to me the most significant ones. 
First, proponents ofa strong employment at will doctrine will argue that 
the standard under the proposed tort ofabusive discharge is nebulous and will 
substantially erode employment at will. On the other side, I think proponents 
of statutory abrogation of employment at will are likely to argue that the 
refashioned tort is an incremental change that would not result in a significant 
increase in employee recoveries. 
Addressing the anticipated objection of at-will advocates, first, the 
tolerance standard that I propose is less amorphous than the standards and 
analyses applied under IIED and WDVPP. It is a classic tort standard, which 
applies a societal value and arrives at an answer by balancing the interests at 
stake. It is more concrete than the outrage standard of IIED, it applies 
specifically to terminations (unlike IED), and it strips away the camouflage 
used by courts in WDVPP by articulating the considerations under the 
standard. I admit that the tolerance standard is not objective and concrete, 
and it is subject to varying interpretations and applications by judges and 
juries. However, I think that I have fashioned a standard, from existing tort 
and contract doctrine, that is better calibrated to the issue of employment 
termination and is not dependent on what are often fictional connections to 
public policy. Essentially, the standard declares that there are terminations 
that are too bad for society to tolerate without the law providing a remedy. 
This is an important declaration of protection for one of the most important 
relationships that exits in American society, and I think it is consistent with 
societal values. The merging of injury to relationships and a standard that 
reflects societal values is an appropriate tort standard. If the uncertainty of 
how the standard will be applied by any particular judge or jury in a case 
gives employers pause in carrying out a termination, that is not a bad thing. 
Given the significance of employment termination, employers should 
359. Professor Colvin notes that employer use of mandatory arbitration agreements did not begin to 
expand until the 1990s and 2000s after the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). See Colvin, supra note 133, at 5-6. 
360. H.R. 1374, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017-2018). 
361. S. 2591, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (2017-2018). 
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consider the decision very carefully. If a termination is reasonably defensible, 
this tort standard should not deter employer decisions. The extent to which 
the refashioned tort would erode employment at will depends on the strength 
of a state's adherence to employment at will. 
Turning to likely objections by advocates of more drastic reform, I 
already have discussed the history and limitations of statutes that abrogate 
employment at will.362 Moreover, my proposal for common law tort 
development does not preclude efforts to enact statutes. I admit that adoption 
of the proposed tort would be incremental progress, but it is progress that is 
worthwhile. The tort ofabusive discharge would give courts an effective tool 
363 with which to provide redress in the most egregious cases. In addition to 
imposing a more substantial imitation on employment at will, I am proposing 
a tort that I think aligns better with societal values and with the decisions 
courts are reaching, or should be reaching, under ill-fitting tort theories. It is 
important that the rationale articulated for recognition of tort theories of 
liability and the case law actually decided be consistent. This has not been 
the case for the tort of WDVPP. The tort of abusive discharge, as I have 
described it, would call for courts to articulate the reasons that actually are 
driving their decisions. Furthermore, if tort theories are worth maintaining, 
then plaintiffs should have some prospect of recovery under them. 
Terminated employees have almost never recovered for IIED. They have 
recovered for WDVPP rarely and spasmodically, with many of the decisions 
defying credible explanation under existing doctrine. This fused tort theory 
seeks to address those infirmities in the law by peeling away the disguise of 
public policy. Consideration of the factors described above makes clear that 
courts actually are evaluating the termination decisions of employers. 
Although this may be characterized as second guessing employer's business 
judgment, the analysis that I have proposed makes clear that the decision is 
being evaluated by taking into account the interests of all stakeholders that 
are implicated in terminations-employers, employees, and society (the 
public). 
Finally, some will ask why I think courts, which have not been creative 
and proactive in employment law since about 1990, would recognize this 
reconceptualized tort. I have several responses. First, I propose what I think 
the law should be, recognizing that I cannot make it so. Second, it seems 
more likely to me that some state courts will consider and adopt the proposed 
tort than it is that state legislatures will pass legislation abrogating 
employment at will. Third, as a general matter, I think that some courts do 
endeavor to understand and improve the law with which they work. 
362. See supraPart III.B. 
363. See, e.g., Gergen, supranote 21, at 1695. 
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Specifically, courts in some states have demonstrated a willingness to adopt 
a more coherent and workable version of the WDVPP tort. Several 
jurisdictions moved from the more common "pigeonhole" approach to the 
elements-based approach."6 Finally, there were circumstances and forces that 
converged in a two-decade or so period that caused courts to become active 
and creative with the common law of employment. Perhaps that will happen 
again on a smaller scale. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The common law has an important role to play in employment law. 
Professor Lawrence Blades saw the need for a tort of abusive discharge in 
the 1960s. During the 1970s and 1980s, courts engaged in a period of 
vigorous development of the common law contract and tort theories used to 
address termination from employment. That period ended around 1990, and 
the courts since have retreated from many of the innovations in the common 
law, thus restoring much of the strength of the employment at will doctrine. 
From that period, however, emerged the most widely recognized common 
law exception to employment at will: the tort of WDVPP. The tort, however, 
is fraught with problems that render it nebulous and generally ineffective, 
and the incoherent doctrine leads to decisions that are difficult to explain. 
The prolific use of statutes to regulate employment has caused courts to relax 
in the development and evolution of common law theories. Statutes, 
however, have significant limitations. Moreover, common law developments 
also play a role in prompting legislative action and providing the background 
and education for enacting legislation. The time has come for courts once 
again to become active, but this time in a more targeted way. Using existing 
tort doctrine under IED and WDVPP, the courts should recognize a 
refashioned tort of abusive discharge under which the dispositive issue is 
whether society should tolerate a discharge. Recognition of such a tort, with 
the benefit of over half a century of development since Professor Blades's 
proposal, would help achieve his vision of an effective tort check on 
employment at will and give the common law a larger role in protecting 
society's interest in a vital attribute of citizenship. 
364. See supraPart V.A. 
